Czechoslovak-Polish relations 1918-1968: The prospects for mutual support in the case of revolt by Medvec, Stephen Edward
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1977 
Czechoslovak-Polish relations 1918-1968: The prospects for 
mutual support in the case of revolt 
Stephen Edward Medvec 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Medvec, Stephen Edward, "Czechoslovak-Polish relations 1918-1968: The prospects for mutual support in 
the case of revolt" (1977). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5197. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5197 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH RELATIONS, 191(3-1968:
THE PROSPECTS FOR MUTUAL SUPPORT IN THE CASE OF REVOLT
By
Stephen E. Medvec 
B. A. , University of Montana,. 1972.
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 
1977
Approved by:
^ .'■\4 i
Chairman, Board of Examiners
raduat'e School
Date
UMI Number: EP40661
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI EP40661
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Medvec, Stephen E., M. A., June 12, 1977 Political Science
Czechoslovak-Polish Relations, 1918-1968: The Prospects for
Mutual Support, in the Case of Revolt (113 PP«)
Director: Forest L. . Grieves / t
This study traces Czechoslovak-Polish political and economic 
relations from the foundations of the two Eastern European states 
in 1918 through the 1968 Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, in which Poland acted as a leading participant.
The study relies heavily upon Czech, Polish, French and English 
sources, and the majority of the research material was gathered in 
Eastern Europe from 1973 to 1975*
The study surveys the lengthy history of mutual Czech-Polish 
cultural prejudice, animosity, and indifference. Because of these 
factors, the Czechs and the Poles, two of Eastern Europe's most 
powerful and influential nations, have never been able to form a 
common bloc to prevent Soviet domination of their respective 
states. One conclusion of the study reveals that the Soviet Union 
has been able to maintain her hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in 
Poland not only because of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, but also 
because of the aforementioned mutual Czech-Polish cultural preju­
dice, animosity, and indifference.
The purpose of the study is to examine the propensity for revolt 
in Eastern Europe since 1953* Because the conservative Eastern 
European Communist regimes have consistently proven to be 
unwilling to honor popular demands for increased freedom of expres­
sion and an improved standard of living, revolt appears to be the 
only means available to the Eastern European peoples to democratize 
the Communist. system of government,. Since the 1975 Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, dissidents 
demanding that the Eastern European regimes honor their human rights 
commitments have appeared throughout Eastern Europe. The political 
and economic situation in Poland is especially critical, and a 
potential Polish insurrection could erupt at any time. If a 
Polish insurrection were to occur, however improbable given the 
widespread fear throughout Eastern. Europe of Soviet military inter­
vention to suppress any revolts, the prospects that the politically 
discontented Czechs would rise up in revolt in mutual support, of 
the Poles appear to be negligible. This conclusion is based upon 
an analysis of negative factors in the Czech-Polish past.
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P R E F A C E
Traditional American study of Eastern Europe focuses pri­
marily upon the unwillingness of several Eastern European states to 
obey unswervingly the Soviet Union's dictates. These studies tend 
to examine the antagonism which exists throughout Eastern Europe 
vis-ci-vis the Soviet Union.
However, few American scholars of Eastern European affairs 
have examined the conflicts and mutual negative attitudes of the 
Eastern European peoples. It is the purpose of this thesis to exa­
mine the mutual negative attitudes of the Czechs and the Poles, two 
of Eastern Europe's most powerful and influential nations.
From October, 1973, to June, 1975, I researched Czechoslovak- 
Polish relations as a Fulbright-Hays scholar at Adam Mickiewicz 
University in Poznan, Poland, under the guidance of Professor Antoni 
Czubinski. The majority of the research sources utilized in this 
thesis was gathered in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. Other European 
as well as American sources constitute the remainder of the research 
material.
Prior to my departure for Poland in September, 1973, I was 
vaguely aware of the negative attitudes which exist between the Czechs 
and the Poles. Two years of study in Eastern Europe contributed to 
an understanding of the intensity of the antagonisms betv/een the two 
Slavic nations. Valuable insights into Czech and Polish attitudes 
wdre obtained not only through research, but also through numerous 
conversations with many Polish citizens. The Polish disdain for the
Czechs was very strong. Furthermore, a month's stay in Czecho­
slovakia in January, 1975i revealed that many Czechs have not yet 
forgiven the Poles for their armed takeover of the Teschen coal 
region in 1958!. Likewise, the 1968 Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, in which Poland acted as a leading participant, 
has remained a bitter topic of Czech discussion.
The intensity of the mutual negative attitudes and distaste 
of the Czechs and the Poles appalled me. This thesis is the result 
of that reaction.
C H A P T E R  I 
INTRODUCTION
The Case for Mutual Support of Revolt in Eastern Europe
Since the Soviet Union's imposition of Communism in Eastern 
Europe after the end of the Second World War, the Eastern European 
peoples have periodically risen in revolt against the Communist 
regimes which have usurped national freedoms and wish to remain 
in power at any cost. The Eastern European Communist regimes have 
maintained their power base through the use of a strong police 
system as well as through the extensive influence of the Communist 
party in all levels of Eastern European society.
However, despite the strong Communist pplice network as well 
as the extensive influence of the Communist party in the Eastern 
European states, periodic popular revolts have occurred in Eastern 
Europe to demand from the Communist elites in power greater politi­
cal or economic freedom. On three occasions (Poland in 1956, Hungary 
in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968), Communists themselves insti­
tuted reforms of the system in support of popular demands for 
increased freedom and national self-determination to conduct internal 
political and economic affairs without the outside interference of 
the Soviet Union.
The other revolts, provoked by either political or economic 
catalysts, include the following: the 1953 uprising in East Berlin,
and the 1953 workers' riots in Plzeft, Czechoslovakia; the 1968 Polish 
student riots; the 1970 and 1976 Polish workers' riots; and the most
2
recent East German demands for personal liberties guaranteed in the 
1975 Helsinki Declaration. As long as freedom remains suppressed 
throughout Eastern Europe, the probability of further revolt to 
demand increased personal liberty and greater national self-deter­
mination will also remain.
Therefore, one can assume that initial revolt in one state 
in Eastern Europe could act as a catalyst to provoke the people of 
another Eastern European state to revolt. Mutual support in the 
case of revolt would cause tremendous consternation not only for 
the ruling Communist elites in the two states involved in the revolt, 
but. also for the Soviet. Union which would have to contend with two 
recalcitrant satellites. Mutual support in the case of revolt could 
possibly lead to greater success in achieving the revolts' objectives, 
e. g., the granting of greater freedom or the overthrow of the 
Communists elites in power, who may be perceived as agents of the 
Soviet Union.
However, such a revolt would most likely not be opposed to 
the idea of socialism. This assumption is based on a July, 1976,
Radio Free Europe survey, The Best Government, which was conducted 
among Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish tourists in the West. The 
RFE survey indicated that the current Communist regimes in power in 
Czechoslovakia (Husak), Hungary (Kcfdar) , and Poland (Gierek) were 
popular among only 3 to 7 percent of those interviewed. Classical 
democracy was popular among 24 to 33 percent of those interviewed, 
while democratic socialism as practiced in Austria and in Sweden 
received a plurality of 40 to 44 percent. According to EFE, the
3
attraction of democratic socialism will continue to increase among 
the youth in the three states, while the attraction of classical 
democracy will correspondingly continue to decrease because those 
who favored it were older persons who had actually experienced it."*" 
It appears as if the Eastern Europeans would prefer to retain some 
of the more positive social benefits of Communism such as free 
university education, extensive maternity benefits, and a compre­
hensive national health care program, but would discard the 
extensive Communist police network as well as one-party rule.
Consequently, what is the probability of a revolt of mutual
support in Eastern Europe, in particular between the peoples of
Czechoslovakia and Poland, two of the most important states among 
the Soviet Union's satellites in Eastern Europe? Is it reasonable
to assume that the peoples of these two states would give their
mutual support in the case of an initial revolt against the Commu­
nist regime in one of the states to demand greater internal 
freedom and increased national sovereignty? Could the Czechs and 
the Poles stand together for their mutual benefit to demand the end 
of Communist oppression in their respective countries and to 
request the Soviet Union to grant them greater national self- 
determination in the running of their internal political and economic 
affairs?
The Question of Czech Support for a Potential Polish Insurrection
In this section,.the current events of Poland and Czechoslo­
vakia are discussed, and the possibility of potential insurrection 
in Poland is revealed. Can one assume that a revolt in Poland could
act as a catalyst among the politically discontented Czechs to 
revolt against their own Communist regime in support of the Poles?
In June, 1976, Polish workers rioted near Warsaw and Radom, 
Poland, to protest the Gierek government's decision to raise food 
prices which the government had previously held stable since 1 97 0. 
Those June riots could possibly indicate that the popular Edward 
Gierek, First Secretary of the United Polish Workers' (Communist) 
Party since his coming to power in December, 1970, as a result of 
food riots in four Polish cities (Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and 
Ebl§.g) , may be losing his popularity among the Polish people. The 
critical meat shortage and the most recent sugar shortage in Poland 
are national scandals and the subjects of much popular complaint 
and criticism. The current Polish situation appears to be 
especially critical.
According to a Polish friend of Jean-Fram;ois Revel, a
French'political writer for the journal L'Express, the Gierek
regime does not have either a viable economic or political solution
for Poland's economic problems. The Pole felt that the Polish
population could erupt at any time in the foreseeable future into
nationwide strikes and demonstrations which could lead to open
insurrection. Furthermore, the Pole believed that the Polish army
could and would vigorously defend Poland against Soviet military
2intervention. "We are not Czechs," he concluded.
The above statement, "We are not Czechs," has two possible 
meanings: (1) the Czechoslovak army has never been permitted to
mobilize to defend Czechoslovakia against an aggressor, either
against the Germans in 1939 or against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact 
invasion in 1968, or (2) the Poles consider the Czechs to be a 
cowardly nation because the Czechs have consistently resorted to 
passive rather than active resistance when confronted with a 
superior military force. Therefore, the Poles believe that they 
could never count on the Czechs to join an initial insurrection.
Unlike the Czech army, which has not supported the people
of Czechoslovakia against aggressors, the Polish army would support
a national insurrection. According to 1969 statistics, the Polish
3army was composed of about 275*000 men in time of peace. A 
reserve organization and citizen's militia also exists.
In his book Poland 19^^-1962: The Sovietization of a
Captive People, Richard Staar states that Poles in general make 
excellent troops and their morale is rated outstanding when they 
are convinced that they are fighting for their homeland. The 
emotional factor of patriotism plays a considerable part in their 
attitude toward war. This was especially evident during the 
Second World War when many Poles fought on several fronts to 
liberate not only their homeland, but also many parts of Europe
kfrom Nazi rule.
The current political situation in Czechoslovakia is also 
critical. 'In. April, 1 9 6 9, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party and President of the Republic (since May, 1975) 
Gustav Husak came to power in Czechoslovakia after the Soviet 
Union forced the Czechoslovak Communist Party elite to remove
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Alexander Dubcek from the position of First Secretary. Dub8ek had 
attempted to eliminate the harshness of the neo-Stalinist period 
in Czechoslovakia under Antonin Novotny by granting freedoms 
unprecedented in a Communist-ruled country to the Czechs and the 
Slovaks during the first eight months of 1968. The result of the 
so-called "Prague Spring” was the brutal Soviet-led VJarsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968.
Since his usurpation of power in 1969, Gustav Ilusak has 
imposed his own version of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia. The 
people of Czechoslovakia are very dissatisfied politically despite 
the fact that the HusAk regime has bribed them with the second 
highest standard of living in the entire socialist bloc, behind 
that of the German Democratic Republic.
On January 1, 1977, 282 Czech intellectuals, many of whom 
were associated with Alexander Dubcek and the 1968 "Prague Spring", 
signed a manifesto, the Charter 77, which is an appeal to the 
Husak regime to honor its commitments to respect fundamental human 
rights in Czechoslovakia, guaranteed in the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights and in the 1975 Helsinki Declaration. 
The full text of Charter 77 is in Appendix A.
According to Iiella Pick, a correspondent for the The 
Guardian, the Charter 77 signatories denied that they were trying 
to establish a political opposition group, but the regime has 
strongly condemned the manifesto. Six of the signatories were 
detained by the police, but were later released.^
Charter 77 could mark the beginning of a national protest
7
movement, the first in Czechoslovakia since the 1968 invasion, which 
could lead to difficult times for the unpopular Husak regime. There­
fore, is it reasonable to assume that the current volatile economic 
situation in Poland could provoke a widespread insurrection within 
the Polish population which could then trigger a revolt of mutual 
support among the politically discontented Czechs?
Statement of Thesis, Justification, Scope, and Focus
The purpose of this thesis is to show that the prospects 
for Czech support of a potential Polish insurrection appear to be 
negligible. Why?
The answer to this intriguing question lies in underlying 
historical Czech-Polish animosities, border disputes, misunder­
standings, and mutual cultural prejudices. One of these prejudices 
has already been stated— the Poles regard the Czechs as a cowardly 
nation. In turn, the Czechs consider the Poles to be reckless 
romantics.
These antagonisms and mutual cultural prejudices between the 
Czechs and the Poles, which have led to widespread mutual indiffer­
ence, have contemporary political relevance and are, therefore, 
important to the political study of post-war Eastern Europe. Because 
of these historical Czech-Polish hostilities and cultural prejudices, 
Soviet hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in Poland has been made easier 
to maintain. Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia and 
Poland as well as Soviet economic controls have also played 
significant roles in the maintenance of Soviet hegemony in the two
satellite states. However, the assumption of this thesis is that 
historical animosities and mutual cultural prejudices between the 
Czechs and the Poles have also played a very crucial role.
Therefore, the focus of the thesis is to demonstrate that 
Czech-Polish conflicts, misunderstandings, mutual petty jealousies, 
and mutual cultural prejudices, which have resulted from a diverse 
historical development in Bohemia and in Poland, have kept the 
two neighboring Slavic nations hostile to each other. Because of 
these factors, the probability of Czech support for a potential 
Polish revolt appears to be negligible.
However, certain factors play a role in overcoming the 
probability of revolt in either Czechoslovakia or in Poland, be it 
mutual support or otherwise. These factors are important but play 
a secondary role in the thesis. The factors are: (l) the very high
standard of living in Czechoslovakia compared to that of Poland 
(The food shortage found in Poland has no counterpart in Czechoslo­
vakia, and one can assume that the Czechs would not sympathize with 
the critical Polish situation.), and (2) the intense fear in 
Czechoslovakia and in Poland of Soviet armed intervention to suppress 
any revolts as were the cases in Hungary in.1956 and Czechoslovakia 
in 1968. (Given the geopolitical realities of post-war Europe, the 
Soviet Union would never permit any of her Eastern European satellite 
to leave the socialist bloc.)
The scope.of the thesis, covering the years 1918 to 1 9 6 8, is 
broad in opder to demonstrate that Czech-Polish antagonisms have an 
extensive existence. These antagonisms began considerably prior to
9
1 9 1 8, but the thesis begins with the foundation of the two states, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, after the end of the First World War and 
closes with the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The scope of the thesis reveals that the Czechs and the 
Poles suffered from two major points of disagreement between 1918 
and 1 9 6 8: (1) Czech friendship toward Russia as opposed to Polish
antagonism toward Russia, and (2) the dispute over Teschen, a rich 
coal area on the Czech-Polish border in southern Silesia. The 
Teschen issue was finally resolved in 19^7*
The Czech friendship toward Russia has a long history, as 
does the corresponding Polish antagonism toward Russia. As a 
result of this very crucial factor, conflicts and misunderstandings 
between the Czechs and the Poles ensued from 1918 to 1968. However, 
in 1968, the Soviet Union brutally crushed the "Prague Spring" in 
Czechoslovakia and simultaneously destroyed the Czech amity for 
Russia.
Therefore, a major point of contention between the Czechs 
and the Poles could have been overcome. However, because Polish 
soldiers also participated in the 1968. invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
a potential Czech-Polish rapprochement perished in the smoke over 
Prague. Unfortunately, Polish participation in the 1968 invasion 
of Czechoslovakia only reinforced Czech hostility toward the entire 
Polish nation.
IQ
Theoretical Framework and Analytical Tools
Within the theoretical framework of this thesis, the prin­
cipal subject of inquiry is the role of Czech-Polish attitude 
formations resulting from Czech-Polish transactions across the 
Czechoslovak-Polish border. In the study of Communist-controlled 
states, however, it is extremely difficult to assess attitudes 
because of the scarcity of reliable data. Fortunately, the major­
ity of the research sources employed in this thesis was gathered 
in Eastern Europe.
This study also employs one political theory and one 
political hypothesis to analyze Czech-Polish relations: (l) the 
"spillover" theory, and (2) a Marshall R. Singer hypothesis which 
deals with the relationship of two small Communist states vis-a- 
vis a larger Communist state, the Soviet Union.
According to Inis L. Claude, the separability of economic 
problems from political problems is only temporary. Claude 
employs the functional "spillover" theory which states that 
excellent relations between two states in the economic sphere may 
"spillover" into the political sphere and lead to political inte­
gration.^ Economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland 
have been excellent since 19^7* but the Czechs and the Poles have 
remained politically distant. Therefore, it appears as if the 
"spillover" theory has no validity in the case of Czechoslovakia 
and Poland.
Finally, the following Marshall R» Singer hypothesis is 
employed to analyze the relationships among the Communist elites in
11
Prague, Warsaw, and Moscow in the years 1956, 1968, and 1971:
In terms of measurable indices of behavior such 
as economic, communications, military, or formal poli­
tical ties, two weak states (A and B) may be equally 
dependent upon a strong third state (X). But if, for 
some reasons, there is a higher degree of similarity 
of political perception between the elites of A an X 
than there is between the elites of B and X, the 
likelihood is that the international political beha­
vior of A will more closely approximate and support 
the political behavior of X than it will of the 
political behavior of B.
This hypothesis has a great deal of validity in the case 
of Czechoslovakia and Poland and is important to the premise that 
Czech-Polish animosities have made it easier for the Soviet Union 
to maintain hegemony in those t\iro satellite states.
12
NOTES:
^The Best Government (New York: The Free Europe Committee,
1976), pp. 8 , l4, 29.
2Jean--Franc;ois Revel, "La resovietasation," L 1Express, No* 
1320 (October 25-31, 1976), p. 6 9.
^Bela K. Kiraly, "Why the Soviets Need the Warsaw Pact,"
East Europe Vol. 18, No. 4 (April, 196 9), p. 8 .
I.LRichard F. Staar, Poland 19^-1962: The Sovletization of
a Captive People (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
196 2), p. 1 3 9.
5He11a Pick, "Czech protesters gather support," The Guardian 
(January 16, 1977), p. 9.
^Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random
House and Knopf, 196*1), p. 351.
7Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The
Dynamics of International Relationships(New Y o r k : T h e  Free Press, 
1972), p. 318.
C H A P T E R  I I
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL BASES OF CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH RELATIONS,
1918-19^5
This chapter examines the diverse historical development in 
Bohemia and in Poland. This diverse historical development has led 
to mutual Czech-Polish antagonisms, cultural prejudices, and petty 
jealousies which continue to plague proper relations between the 
Czechs and the Poles. The chapter also emphasizes the importance 
of the conflict over Teschen as well as the Czech-Polish disagree­
ment about the role of the Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs. 
These two events played crucial roles in undermining Czech-Polish 
rapprochement during the inter-war and war periods and contributed 
to Soviet hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in Poland after the end 
of the Second World War.
The Inter-war Years, 1918-19^5
The Creation of Czechoslovakia and Poland at Versailles 
In the late autumn of 1918, after the fall of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, the treaty of Versailles created the Republic of 
Czechoslovakia composed of the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia), 
Slovakia, and Ruthenia. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk became the 
republic's first president and served in that capacity until his 
death in 1937»
Also, in November, 1918, the Polish government issued a 
decree which declared that Poland was a republic upon the first 
convocation of the Sejm (parliament). Jozef PiXsudski was
temporarily declared Chief of State.
Simultaneously with the creation of the new Polish Republic, 
the young Polish state entered into quarrels over its borders 
which had not yet been established despite the fact that Poland 
suffered from not only a ruined economy after the war, but also 
from overwhelming poverty. In February, 1919, Pil-sudski decided 
to launch an offensive into the territories of the Ukraine, White 
Russia, and Lithuania. Furthermore, the western borders of the 
young Polish state were not peaceful. In December, 1918, Poles 
living in the Grand Duchy of Poznan rose up in revolt against the 
Germans. The Duchy officially joined the Polish Republic in June, 
1919 . 1 Finally, disagreement over the Czech-Polish border led to 
armed conflict and fruitless diplomatic discussions between 
Czechoslovakia and Poland.
. The Czech-Polish Conflict over Teschen, 1918-1938 
On November 5, 1918, the Polish Rada Narodowa Ksi^stwa 
Cieszynskiego (National Council for the Duchy of Teschen) and the 
Czech Zemsky Narodni Vybor pro Slezsko (National Land Council for 
Silesia) signed an interim agreement which created a line of 
demarcation in Teschen (Czech— ^esky Tesin; Polish— Cieszyn) to 
limit conflicts. Under the agreement, the Polish Rada Narodowa 
controlled the ethnically Polish region around Teschen (80 percent 
Polish population versus 20 percent Czech) plus the rich coal mines 
at Karwinskie Zag^fbie. However, the Czechoslovak government did 
not accept this agreement because heavily industrialized Czecho­
slovakia required the rich Polish coal mines for her industrial
15
2production. Therefore, by the end of 1918, the Czechs were 
prepared for the military takeover of the entire Silesian area 
around Teschen.
Taking advantage of the Polish conflict in the Ukraine and 
White Russia, as well as declaring that the Poles had rejected the 
Teschen agreement of November 5» 1918, because Teschen was to be 
included in the approaching Polish parliamentary elections, the 
Czech army crossed the line of demarcation on January 23, 1919* 
Approximately sixteen thousand well-armed Czech soldiers encountered 
little resistance in overwhelming fifteen hundred Polish soldiers, 
some coal miners, iron workers, railway employees, and peasants.
On January 30 > 1919» Polish reinforcements halted the Czech 
offensive at Skoczow. On February 3* 1919» Czechoslovak Foreign 
Minister Edvard Benes and Polish Minister Roman Dmowski signed a 
new agreement in Paris which dealt with the disputed area. The 
old line of demarcation was not restored because the Czechs occupied 
the coal mines at Karwinskie ZagX<?bie which proved to be of great 
importance for Czech industry.
On August 10, 1920, at Sevres, France, the Council of 
Ambassadors of the Great Powers divided the disputed Silesian area 
around Teschen between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Poland received 
an area of 1,012 sq. km. plus 1^1,000 persons. This area included 
the district of Bielsko, sections of the Duchy of Teschen, the 
district of Frysztat, the city of Teschen, except for the railway 
station and tracks, plus sections of Spis and Orava, both located 
in northern Slovakia. Czechoslovakia received the remainder—
16
1 ,2 7 0 sq. km, and 293*000 persons plus the rich coal mines at 
Karwinskie ZagXqbie, the primary goal of the 1919 Czech military
3intervention. See the map on the following page.
The Western powers hoped that this division would solve the
Teschen issue between the Czechs and the Poles. Unfortunately, the
issue continued to be a source of constant border conflicts which 
culminated in the Polish armed intervention of Czechoslovakia in 
1938.
Despite the border conflicts between Czechoslovakia and 
Poland during the first years of the new states'■ existence, political 
relations between the two states to 1926 were cool, but proper.
In May, 1926, the Jozef PiXsudski coup d ’etat in Poland
brought into question the modest improvement in Czech-Polish
relations. PiXsudski possessed strong anti-Czech sentiments. He 
refused to forgive the Czechs for their 1919 Teschen intervention 
as well as for their 1920 refusal to permit the transit of French
arms to Poland during the Polish war with Soviet Russia.
The nomination of Colonel Jdzef .Beck in December, 1932, to
be the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs was unfortunate for Poland
and for Czechoslovakia. Because of his intense personal aversion 
for Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard BeneIf and for the Czechs, 
Beck conducted a foreign policy designed to lead to rapprochement 
with Nazi Germany against Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the Polish 
minority issue in the Silesian area around Teschen resurfaced as 
an important point of contention. Beck intended to employ the 
Polish minority issue in Czechoslovakia to realize his long-range
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objective, the destruction of Czechoslovakia.
Under pressure from the Polish government and the Polish 
consulate in Czechoslovakia (the Czechs and the Poles did not have 
full diplomatic relations during the inter-war period), the leaders 
of the Polish political groups active in Czech Silesia began to 
oppose the Czech government. In commemoration of the fifteenth 
anniversary of the Teschen conflict, the Polish groups organized 
demonstrations, ignited nationalistic sentiments among the Poles, 
and encouraged the breakdown of peaceful Czech-Polish coexistence. 
After the 1935 Czechoslovak parliamentary elections, relations 
between the two nationalities became tenser, and constant demon­
strations and manifestations of hatred on both sides were a 
normal phenomenon.^
In the Polish government and in the private press, anti- 
Czech articles began to appear more frequently. PiXsudski, driven 
by his old pretenses and hatreds for Czechoslovakia, refused to 
hold audiences with the Czech envoy in Warsaw, Girsa. PiXsudski 
considered Czechoslovakia to be an artificial creation which could 
not possibly continue to exist because of her three million Germans 
plus active Slovak, Hungarian, and Polish separatist movements. 
Because of his negative attitude, PiXsudski preferred not to conclude 
any agreements with Czechoslovakia.
In 193^, the PiXsudski-Beck regime was prepared to reannex 
the entire Silesian area around Teschen to the Olza Biver, e. g., 
Zaolzie. The Polish General Staff was summoned under a conspira­
torial organization entitled the "Committee of Seven," whose
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purpose was to organize the political and sabotage activities in
Teschen. The principal task of the "Committee of Seven" was to
prepare an armed revolt in the entire Silesian area around Teschen
which would act as a pretext for the Polish army's intervention 
5into the region.
During one of Beck's conversations with French Minister 
Barthou, the subject of Czech-Polish relations emerged. Beck stated 
that the basis for the poor relations was neither general policy 
nor motives for prestige, but rather the Czech government's poor 
treatment of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia. (Jozef Beck 
possessed a seemingly pathological hatred for the Czechs which 
interfered with clear and objective evaluations of the critical 
geographical position of Czechoslovakia and Poland vis-a-vis Nazi 
Germany.) Therefore, when Barthou spoke about the Slavic kinship 
of the Czechs and the Poles, Beck reminded him of Poland's 
historical sympathy for the "heroic and chivalrous" Hungarians.
(A Hungarian prince, Stefan Batory, was King of Poland from 1575 to 
1586. Furthermore, a lengthy cultural affinity between the Polish 
and the Hungarian aristocracies has also existed.) Beck continued 
by stating that despite the common ethnic bond, the Poles feel 
little sympathy for the Czechs. He stated that the Poles hold a 
stronger affinity for the Slovaks who, like the Poles, are very 
devout Catholics and whose language resembles Polish more than it 
does Czech.^ The importance of Beck's statement is explained in 
the following section of the chapter.
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Finally, the issue of the Czech treatment of the Polish 
minority in Czechoslovakia came to a dramatic climax, the Polish 
military annexation of the entire Zaolzie area.
In September, 1938., the Polish government demanded 
categorically from Prague that it apply the same rights to the 
Polish minority which it had granted to the Sudeten German minority. 
Warsaw simultaneously terminated the 1925 agreements with Czecho­
slovakia, among them the arbitration treaty.which had the nature 
of a pact of non-aggression. The Polish army began to assemble 
on the Czechoslovak-Polish border near Teschen. For the time being, 
the Polish General Staff did not order an attack on Czechoslovakia. 
Beck waited until the conclusion of the fatal Munich Conference.
In order to reduce the Polish threat, Kamil Krofta, the 
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister under President BeneiS’ (Benes became 
Czechoslovakia's second president after Thomas Masaryk's death in 
1937), asked the S oviet envoy in Prague to request Soviet army 
maneuvers on the Polish border. (The Czechs had concluded a pact 
of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union in 1935*) Moscow agreed 
to this demand and also informed France that if Poland attacked 
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet army would attack Poland. However,
Warsaw did not take the Soviet threat seriously because it,over­
estimated its own military strength and also counted on German
7military assistance.
Because he considered Poland to be a major European power, 
Beck was infuriated that he had not been invited to Munich to
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participate in the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Therefore, he 
reacted with brutality on Czechoslovakia. The Polish army's 
intervention into the entire Silesian area around Teschen at the 
same time of the German annexation of the Sudetenland created the 
impression that Germany had agreed with the Polish action. By
annexing the area, Beck also wished to reveal Poland's alleged
8military capabilities.
As a result of Beck’s intense hatred for the Czechs, he
was blind to the fact that Czechoslovakia was necessary for Poland's
security. Czechoslovakia's border with Poland measured about 850
kilometres in length and prevented a German attack on Poland from 
9the south. After Hitler had occupied Czechoslovakia on March 15, 
1939, Germany surrounded Poland on three sides. Therefore, Poland 
should have stood firm in the defense of Czechoslovakia rather than 
participate with Hitler in her destruction.
If Poland had supported Czechoslovakia during the 1938 
Sudeten crisis, it is possible that the ’war of 1939 could have been 
avoided. If war had broken out In 1938, Germany would have suffered 
a catastrophic defeat as was foreseen by the German General Staff 
because she was not totally prepared for war. Germany in 1938 did 
not yet possess Czechoslovakia's vast economic, industrial, and 
military wealth which she did acquire in March, 1939* It is truly 
unfortunate that a man driven by ambition bordering on megalomania 
and obsessed with hatred for his southern neighbor held' the reigns 
of power in Warsaw during this critical period in European history.
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The importance of the conflict over Teschen was that it 
contributed a new phase to a long history of mutual Czech-Polish 
distaste. It corrupted not only the possibility of a Czech-Polish 
rapprochement during the inter-war period, but also stood as a 
major factor in the failure of the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation 
in 19^3, to be discussed later in this chapter. The Teschen issue 
was not officially resolved’ until 19^7. Unfortunately, many Czechs 
still regard the 1938 Polish intervention into the area as an 
issue of contention with the Poles.
The Cultural Differences between the Czechs and the Poles
A diverse historical development in Bohemia and Poland has
led to numerous contradictory elements in the national character 
traits of the Czechs and the Poles. According to Karl Bader, a 
Polish envoy to Prague during the inter-war period, the ill will 
between the Czechs and the Poles is explained by a difference in 
culture, history, and foreign influences. These cultural and 
historical differences, which have created a diversity of tempera­
ment and contributed to a deepening conflict between the Czechs 
and the Poles, are very difficult to overcome. The Poles, whom the
Czechs consider to be proud and reckless romantics, regard the
Czechs as slightly-polished peasants despite the fact that their 
languages are quite similar. This ethnic relationship, Bader 
continues, has also allowed corresponding weaknesses to develop, e. g., 
a strong obstinacy in negotiations as well as excessive national
• -4.. .4. 10sensxtivity.
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"Bourgeois" Czechoslovakia versus "Aristocratic" Poland 
William Rose, in his 1951 study of Czech and Polish national 
characteristics, writes that the Czech perception of the Poles as 
proud, as well as the Polish perception of the Czechs as slightly- 
polished peasants, is derived from the fact that the Czechs lost 
their aristocracy as a result of the Austrian victory over the 
Czechs at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. The Czech aristo­
cracy was simply annihilated. Thereafter, the Czechs became 
virtually a one-class bourgeois society.
On the contrary, the Polish aristocracy, excessively.
influenced by the French aristocracy, dominated Polish affairs up
11to the Communist takeover of Poland in 194A. Therefore, the Czechs 
and the Poles suffered from the lack of a culturally unifying force 
because Czech society was predominantly bourgeois, while Polish 
society was divided between a dominating aristocracy and an over­
whelming peasant population.
"Bourgeois" Czechoslovakia and "aristocratic" Poland were 
eliminated after the Communist takeovers of both states in 19^8 and 
19^4, respectively. However, those character traits can still be 
found among many Czechs and Poles today despite "the imposition of 
Communism.
Religious Differences between the Czechs and the Poles 
Religious differences also represent a factor in explaining 
the antagonism between the Czechs and the Poles,
The Roman Catholic Church has always played a very important 
role in Polish and in Slovak society. Despite the imposition of
2k
Communism in Czechoslovakia and in Poland, Poles and Slovaks remain
intensely religious and willingly participate in large numbers at
Mass and Catholic religious festivities. Anti-clericalism in Poland
and in Slovakia appears to be virtually negligible. Furthermore,
the Poles and the Slovaks maintain a strong mutual cultural and
ethnic amity. (Colonel Beck referred to this Polish-Slovak,
cultural amity in his discussion with French minister Barthou.)
On the contrary, the Roman Catholic Church has played a less
important role in Bohemia, where the Hussite Revolt of the fifteenth
century remains a high point in Czech national history. The
majority of Czechs practice Catholicism, but, because of the strong
Hussite influence on Czech thought, the Czechs tend to be very
anti-clerical and are not as devoutly religious as are the Poles and 
12the Slovaks. A strong Protestant element, which does not exist in 
either Poland or in Slovakia, can also be found in Bohemia.
Czech Passivity versus Polish Romanticism 
The Polish perception of the Czechs as a cowardly nation and 
the Czech perception of the Poles as reckless romantics are very 
crucial elements in the study of Czech-Polish ill will.
The Poles regard the Czechs as cowards because the Czechs 
have consistently resorted to realistic passive resistance when 
confronting a superior force. On the other hand, the Poles have 
shown a willingness to die for a cause. ^  In this regard, the Czechs 
perceive their northern Slavic neighbors to be reckless romantics.
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Edward Taborsky, Bene§' secretary who fled to the United 
States after the 19̂ -8 Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, writes 
the following about the Czech national character:. " . . .  down-to- 
earth realism, an overdose of caution, a dislike for risks, a lack 
of romantic heroism. When confronted with a superior force, the 
average Czech resorts to devious maneuvering, covered by a pretense 
of submission rather than overt opposition. He is ready to fight
14only xf the chance for success appears to be imminent."
This Czech national preference for "caution, lack of 
romantic heroism, and devious maneuvering, covered by a pretense 
of submission . . . "  was immortalized in The Good Soldier Schweik, 
Jaroslav Halfek-s classic novel about Czech passive resistance 
within the Austrian army during the First World War. The Czech 
national characteristic of passive resistance is now called 
"Schweikism".
During the Second World War, the diverse national character, 
traits of the Czechs and the Poles revealed themselves in striking 
statistics. Six million Poles, or 2.2. percent of the Polish popula­
tion, perished, while only 1.5 percent of the Czech population was
killed. Within the realm of national v/ealth, Poland lost 58 percent,
15while Czech losses were negligible. The Polish capital of Warsaw 
was completely destroyed during the war, while Prague, the Czecho­
slovak capital, remained virtually unscathed despite the war.
The above statistics have led the Poles to believe that the_ 
Czechs collaborated with the Nazis in Czechoslovakia during the war
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to save their lives and their lovely capital. The Polish 
perception of the Czechs to be "Germanized" Slavs is extremely 
important for comprehending the general Polish reaction to the 
Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in which Poland 
played an important role. The invasion is discussed in the fourth 
chapter.
Diverse Czech and Polish Perceptions vis-a-vis Russia
The diverse historical development in Bohemia and in 
Poland also led to the sharpest and most crucial difference between
the Czechs and the Poles, the disagreement over the role of the
Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs. The Czechs possessed a 
positive attitude toward the Soviet Union, while the Poles held a 
correspondingly negative one. The diversity of attitude between 
the Czechs and the Poles concerning the Soviet Union was vital for
the Soviet Union's post-war intentions in Czechoslovakia and in
Poland.
After the Habsburg victory over the Czechs at White Mountain 
in 1620, the Czech lands fell under Austrian control for almost 
three hundred years. Because of Austria's intensive Germanization/ 
program, Czech culture and language were almost liquidated. The 
trend toward Germanization was finally checked, if not definitely 
halted, during the final quarter of the eighteenth century, when a 
small group of patriotic Czech scholars, writers, and teachers began 
to work for the cause of Czech liberty and national awareness. At 
the same time, many Czechs looked to Russia as the most important 
Slavic nation and the potential liberator of the Czechs from Austrian
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hegemony
This favorable Czech attitude toward Russia explains the 
Czech refusal to permit the transit of French arms to Poland during 
Poland's 1920 war with the Soviet Union, the 1935 Czechoslovak- 
Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, and the failure of the Czechoslo- 
vak-Polish Confederation in 19^3» Unfortunately, this positive 
Czech attitude toward Russia endured until 1968, when it was 
finally crushed under the weight of Soviet tanks.
On the contrary, the Poles could not share or comprehend 
the Czech viewpoint that Russia would liberate the Slavs from the 
Germans. After the Partitions of Poland in 1772, 17931 and 1795» 
the Poles rose up in revolt against the Russians in 179*N 1830-31, 
and again in 1 8 6 3. Each time the Russian armies brutally 
suppressed the revolts. Therefore, the Poles developed a firmly 
negative attitude toward anything Russian. Furthermore, because 
the Czechs were pro-Russian, the Poles considered them to be pro- 
Communist during the inter-war period. (The Czechs believed that 
because the Poles were anti-Russian, they were consequently not 
true Slavs.
The importance of the diverse Czech-Polish attitude toward 
the Soviet Union becomes clearer in the third part of this chapter 
as well as in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.
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The War Years
The Failure of the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation 
In November, 19^0, Dr. Edvard Benes, the head of the 
Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London, formally initiated 
negotiations with the Polish Government-in-Exile, led by General 
W^adys^aw Sikorski, to form a post-war Czechoslovak-Polish confedera­
tion. Sikorski, whose pro-Czechoslovak sympathies were an unusual 
quality for a Pole, overwhelmingly supported the idea. On November 
11, 19^0, the two governments signed a joint declaration favoring 
closer political and economic cooperation* The plan offered 
Czechoslovakia and Poland the possibility of becoming a joint 
confederated power in Central Europe after the end of the war.
Bene& attempted to create the confederation with Poland to 
defend Czechoslovakia's exposed geographical position in Central 
Europe in the post-war era. Bene& was afraid of a revitalized 
Germany. Having been betrayed by France and Great Britain in 1938
and 1939* Bene& felt that his best option was to form an alliance
18with his eastern neighbor.
However, in 19^3* less than three years after its initia­
tion, the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation failed miserably. The 
confederation failed for two reasons, both of which are discussed in 
this chapter: (1) the Czech-Polish conflict over Teschen, and (2)
the disagreement over the role of the Soviet Union in Eastern 
European affairs. The failure of the Czechoslovak-Polish Confedera­
tion ensured the Soviet Union's post-war domination of Czechoslovakia
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and Poland.
In his book Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great 
-Powers, Piotr Wandycz writes that the declaration to form the 
confederation did not solve the existing differences between Benes 
and Sikorski. The declaration's primary importance was to commit 
the two governments to close cooperation. However, the two states­
men possessed diverse opinions concerning the role of the Soviet 
Union in Eastern European affairs. Bene^ believed that the Czechs 
and the Poles should cooperate with the Soviet Union, while 
Sikorski feared the Russians. Sikorski pushed for greater political, 
economic, and military cooperation between Czechoslovakia and
Poland and pleaded with Bene& to exclude the Russians from any
19Czech-Polish negotiations. Given the favorable Czech attitude 
toward the Russians as well as the corresponding Polish antagonism, 
Bene&' and Sikorski's actions are not difficult to comprehend.
Wandycz feels that Benes proposed the creation of a Czecho­
slovak-Polish confederation not out of a desire to ameliorate Czech- 
Polish relations, but rather out of selfish opportunism. Because 
Czechoslovakia was in a vacuum without her chief ally, the Soviet 
Union, which had not yet entered the war, Bene£ turned to the Poles 
with his proposal to form a confederation. However, Benes' proposal
to form a confederation with Poland was purposely made vague so as
20not to jeopardize Czechoslovak relations with the Soviet Union.
The following statement by Beneif on July 12, 19^1, verifies 
Wandycz's observation that Banes' was waiting for the Soviet Union to 
enter the war. The statement also reveals Bene&' insight into the
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future of post-war Europe:
The whole future depends on the victory or the
defeat of Russia, oh the condition in which she leaves
the war. For us (Czechoslovakia), that is the deciding 
factor. After the war as well as for the next twenty 
years, France will not yet possess the strength to 
play a leading role in European politics. For the next 
five years, England will be weak and go with America on 
another path. Only Russia and Germany will remain in 
Europe, so, I hope that Russia will play the deciding 
role.
For us, this foundation is exceptionally 
important; the whole future of the republic depends on 
it. I am only conceded that the Russians perform 
their politics well.
After the Soviet Union entered the war, Stalin easily 
manipulated Benes to force him to halt his negotiations with Sikorski. 
With Stalin's support, Benes renewed his demands for the return of 
Teschen to Czechoslovakia. (The subject of Teschen had been dis­
creetly and intentionally placed aside during the initial Czech-
Polish negotiations to form the confederation.) Sikorski himself 
believed that Poland's possession of Teschen was justifiable.
In regard to Stalin, Sikorski pleaded with Benes not to 
believe in Stalin for he was convinced that Stalin possessed post­
war territorial ambitions in Czechoslovakia and in Poland. However, 
Benes continued to believe in Stalin until just prior to his death 
in June, 19^8, after the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 
February of that same year. Bene£ finally realized that he had been 
Stalin's dupe, as he confirmed, on his death bed: "My greatest mis­
take was that I refused to believe to the very last that even 
Stalin lied to me cynically both in 1935 [the year that Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet Union signed the Pact of Mutual Assistanc0 and later,
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and that his assurances to me and to Masaryk ( J a n , the first
president's amiable son who served as Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
until his death by defenestration in 19^C! were an intentional 
22deceit."
Thus, the argument over Teschen as well as the disagree­
ment over the role of the Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs 
destroyed the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation in 19^3* After the 
confederation had failed, Benes went to Moscow in December, 19^3» 
and concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union 
in which each state pledged to act after the war "in accordance 
with the principles of mutual' respect for the independence and
sovereignty, as well as of non-interference in the internal affairs,
23of the other state." It was also agreed that as Russian troops 
entered Czechoslovakia, they would be accompanied by Czech forces, 
and the liberated areas would be progressively handed over to the 
Czechoslovak civil administration. However, none of Stalin's 
promises was honored.
The confederation represented the first and only endeavor 
by the two hostile Slavic nations to attempt to settle their long 
history of antagonism and mistrust. • The London negotiations 
represented an ideal situation for the resolution of disputes 
between the two states of Czechoslovakia and Poland because London 
was a neutral site. Once the Soviet Union began to interfere, the 
ideal situation perished, and the mutual Czech-Polish inability to 
comprehend each other's historical perceptions renewed the old 
antagonisms.
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The long history of Czech amity toward Russia and the 
corresponding Polish distrust for Russia proved to be the decisive 
factors. Therefore, Dr. Bene£ undermined his own enlightened 19^0 
proposal to create the Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation because 
his positive Czech attitude toward Russia superseded any super­
ficial intention of ameliorating Czech relations with the Poles.
The Poles themselves could never comprehend the Czech amity toward 
Russia.
The failure of the confederation ensured Soviet hegemony in 
Czechoslovakia and in Poland after the end of the Second World War.
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C H A P T E R  I I I
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH
RELATIONS, 1945-196?
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first purpose 
is to discuss the Polish government's 1956 liberalization program 
which resulted from widespread popular demands for "democratic" 
changes within Stalinist Poland. Reactions of the Czech people and 
government to the liberalization program in Poland are also examined.
The second purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
excellent economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland 
despite the correspondingly poor political relations which continue 
to exist between the two states. The section 011 economic relations 
attempts to show that even though Czechoslovakia and Poland enjoy 
excellent economic relations, the political relations between the 
two states remain distant despite the imposition of Communism in both 
states after the end of the Second World War.
The Impact of the Stalinist Period in Poland
In 1944, the Red Army entered Poland from the east and 
established a pro-Soviet Polish Communist government in Lublin.
By the time of the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, the 
United States and Great Britain had recognized the new Communist- 
dominated Polish government in Lublin, though stressing its 
obligation to "hold free and unfettered elections as soon as 
possible" in accordance with the agreement at Yalta. Both
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Churchill and Truman pressed Stalin for public assurances that the 
Polish elections should also be freely observed by the world press. 
Stalin, after some argument, agreed to include in the Potsdam 
communique' some words about the observation of free elections in 
Poland. Although the Soviet premier had told Roosevelt at Yalta 
that elections could take place in Poland one month after the 
country's liberation from the Nazis, it was actually two years 
later, in January, 19^7, that elections were held— after the non- 
Communist parties in Poland, especially the popular Stanis^aw 
MikoXajczyk's Peasant Party, had been thoroughly terrorized, their 
news censored, their meetings often banned, and some of their 
leaders jailed.
Poland's boundaries had been redrawn at the 19^5 Potsdam 
Conference. During the war, Stalin had occupied the Polish lands 
east of the so-called Curzon line. In order to compensate Poland 
for her territorial losses in the east, Poland expanded west to the 
Oder-Neisse line at the. expense of Germany. The Oder-Neisse issue 
became the unpopular Communist government's most important means of 
support from the Polish population.
The border issue is of vital importance to the Poles who do 
support the government on the issue no matter what their political 
affiliation. Because the horror of the Second World War remains 
among the Poles, the fear of the German Federal Republic and of 
German reunification is oftentimes stronger among the Polish people 
than the Western press indicates. The perceived military strength 
of the Federal Republic is also stronger than is the Republic's
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actual military strength.
The Polish Communists constantly remind the Polish nation
of the Oder-Neisse border issue. Poland is not necessarily
following Moscow's dictates in opposing reunification of the two 
Germanies or transferal of the borders, but rather the Poles are 
acting out of personal conviction no matter what their political 
point of view.^
After the 19^7 elections, the Communists were firmly in 
power in Poland. Terrorism in the name of Stalin became common­
place throughout the country. The state forced the Polish peasants
to collectivize their lands according to the Soviet model, although
resistance to the policy of collectivization remained strong 
throughout the Stalinist period. Polish industry was nationalized, 
the Roman Catholic Church was persecuted, intensive Russification 
became the norm, and those who opposed the regime were imprisoned, 
maltreated, or both. The Communists also suppressed all of the 
former Polish soldiers who had fought against the Nazis in Poland 
or in the West with the Allies because they considered them to be 
"enemies of the state," The Silesian industrial city of Katowice 
was also renamed "Stalinogrcfd" in honor of Stalin.
The importance of Russification is glaring in the case of 
Poland. The previous chapter has already discussed the long 
historical Polish animosity toward Russia a-s well as toward anything 
Russian. However, because the Poles are Slavs, they were required 
to identify with the concepts of pan-Slavism, the "great"' Russian
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people, their history, and their contemporary world-wide contri­
butions. Russian language became, and still is, a mandatory 
subject in Polish schools.
In 19^9, in order to rewrite the dismal record of Polish- 
Russian history, the.pro-Soviet Bierut regime inaugurated 
"Friendship with the U.. S. S. R. Month" in Poland. During this 
drive, no phase of propaganda was overlooked. The drive included 
mass meetings throughout the country, performances of Russian plays 
and films, exhibitions, lectures, concerts, and the sale of 500 ,00 0  
Russian books. During "friendship month", all theatres in Poland 
showed Russian modern and classical plays, and most cinemas 
were restricted to Russian films. The world-publicized Chopin 
Centennial also had to compete for a place with Russian music on 
Polish radio.^
Historically, Poland has usually been considered along with 
Ireland as the stronghold and bastion of Roman Catholicism. Ninety- 
five percent of the Poles practice Catholicism, and the faith is 
associated^ with Polish patriotism and nationalism. Therefore, 
because of Marxist atheism and also because the Church represented 
competition to Marxist ideology, the complete eradication of 
Catholicism in Poland became the objective of the Bierut regime. 
However, the Communists have still not succeeded in their goal to 
eradicate Catholicism from Polish society.
With the arrest of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski in September, 
1953* Communist persecution of the Roman Catholic Church reached 
its climax. The period that followed was marked by a cessation of
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attacks against Church dignitaries and a decrease in regime assaults 
on religious festivities.
However, within the bounds of a more cautious policy, the 
Bierut regime continued indirect steps to tighten its control 
over the Church. On August 2, 195^ 1 the regime announced the 
liquidation of the theological faculties at the Universities of 
Cracow and of Warsaw. In December, 195^+» the regime announced the 
abolition of religious instruction in the Polish school system.
The decree applied'to all public schools. Religious instruction 
was restricted to special and private religious schools as well, as 
to the Catholic University in Lublin. However, religious instruc­
tion at the Catholic University was also curtailed.
The Bierut regime partially acknowledged its failure to 
diminish the Church's influence in Poland by permitting the revival 
of religious processions on holidays, by dealing cautiously with 
large numbers of church-goers, including members of the Communist 
Party, and by adopting a more tolerant attitude toward religious 
practices. In 1955 ■» there were an estimated 2,000 convents and 
monasteries in Poland plus a total of 8,37^ churches, not including
1,690 small chapels and 1 ,6 6 2 churches acquired in the formerly
5German territories.
In conclusion, one astute Polish political observer, writing 
in 1 9 6 8, describes the evils of one-party rule in the Eastern 
European states:
k l
Among all of the common characteristics found 
among the states in the socialist camp, the most 
important is the principle of one-party rule. An 
attempt is made to legitimize one-party rule in a 
society which has liquidated classes and nationalized 
the private means of production. A society dominated 
by one-party rule is a society deprived of internal 
contradictions, a society without differences. There­
fore, only one party is necessary.
That premise is false because even within a 
classless society, people are different. Means exist 
to isolate and to differentiate groups with diverse 
interests and demands. Even a society deprived of 
class differences is not a uniform society, but 
rather one composed of groups with changing and even 
conflicting needs and desires. The goal of a state 
as an institution is to integrate the various groups 
as well as to create a means of mediation among them.
A multi-party system attempts to create a 
legal framework for groups of diverse interests. A" 
system of one-party rule, both in theory and in 
practice, negates the existence of conflicting groups 
and also negates thg appearance of social tension 
within the society.
The Impact of the Stalinist Period in Czechoslovakia
On May 6, 19if5» General George S. Patton's Third Army 
liberated the Czech city of Plzen, located sixty miles southwest of 
Prague, but halted there., A Soviet-American agreement made in 
early April had defined Plzen as the "line of demarcation" in 
Czechoslovakia. The Russian high command had already mapped 
"Operation Prague" and asked the Americans to allow them to liberate 
the Czechoslovak capital. The Plzen agreement was neither the first 
nor the last time that the major powers "played spheres of influence" 
in Czechoslovakia.
The Prague Uprising against the Nazis began on May 19^5*
On May 8, Prague was liberated by General Vlasov’s Ukrainian Regiment
h-2
which had been fighting with the Nazis against the Soviets. (General
Vlasov's Ukrainian regiment was fighting for Ukrainian independence
from the Soviet Union.) On May 9» 19^5, the Red Army entered Prague,
and that date is now observed in Czechoslovakia as "Soviet Liberation
nDay". The Soviets thereafter executed General Vlasov.
Unlike Poland which fell under Communist control during the 
war, Czechoslovakia remained a democracy until the Communist 
coup d'etat in February, 19^8. However, the preparations for the 
Communist coup began immediately after the end of the war.
After the war, the Communists, led by Element Gottwald, 
exploited the situation in Czechoslovakia created by the Soviet military 
presence and liberation by acquiring control of key cabinet posts in 
the government, police, radio, and land distribution. By control­
ling these important positions, the Communists forced through 
nationalization of industry and currency reform, both designed to 
weaken the influence of the bourgeoisie. They also exploited their 
wartime prestige acquired during the Slovak Uprising of
In May,. 19^6, the first post-war parliamentary elections took 
place. The Red Army was not present within the Czechoslovak borders 
to exert pressure, but it was located in all of the countries 
surrounding Czechoslovakia.
The Communists won 38 percent of the total national vote, more 
in the Czech lands than in Slovakia. The Social Democrats won 12.8 
percent, the Czech National Socialists (President Bene^' political 
party).18.2 percent, the Catholic People's Party 15.8 percent, and 
the Slovak Democrats 13*8 percent. The 19^6 parliamentary elections
were the last free elections to take place in Czechoslovakia.
Dana Adams Schmidt describes the situation in Prague one 
month prior to the Communist coup d ’etat of February 25, 19^8, which 
resulted from a parliamentary crisis:
The city of Prague in that month of January,
19^8, before the coup, presented a deceptively 
pleasant cosmopolitan picture. The big downtown 
newsstands were stuffed with newspapers from England,
France, and Switzerland, as well as from the east 
European countries that had gone Communist, and from 
the Soviet Union. The windows of the bookshops were 
piled high, especially with English and American 
literature, but also with a fair sprinkling of Marx,
Lenin, and Stalin. There were plenty of American 
plays, although Soviet productions were not entirely 
neglected. Playful Americans and other Western 
foreigners on vacation seemed to be everywhere, in 
the hotels, restaurants and night clubs. There were 
no Communist counterparts, for Communist countries 
do not very often allow their citizens to play in 
foreign places. On the whole, after a casual glance 
at Prague, one might have said that "coexistence" 
was working well in Czechoslovakia.
Behind the scenes, however, the Communists 
were watching for their chance to change radically 
the picture presented by Prague, The chance fell 
into their laps, like a gift from the Communist 
heaven, in the form of a government crisis over 
Communist subversion of the police force.
After the 19^-8 Communist coup d'etat, the Communists repeated 
the horrors found in Poland. Czech and Slovak peasants lost their 
lands to intensive collectivization based on the Soviet model; 
police terrorism became rampant; Communist purge trials, especially 
that of Slansk./ and Clementis in 1951 * occurred throughout the land; 
Russification developed in Czechoslovak schools, universities, and 
cultural life; the Roman Catholic Church suffered from .cruel
persecution, and Archbishop Beran was imprisoned; forced labor camps
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were built throughout the country; and the role played by the 
Western armies in the liberation of Czechoslovakia was ignored.
Klement Gottwald, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Commu­
nist Party and President of the Republic from 19^8 until his death 
in 1953, ruled Czechoslovakia with an iron hand. (Gottwald caught 
cold at Stalin's 1953 funeral and died three weeks later of 
pneumonia aggravated by an earlier case of syphilis.^ His Stalin­
ist counterpart in Poland, Boles^faw Bierut, also suffered a violent 
death— he was murdered in 1956 in Moscow while attending the 
Twentieth Soviet Party Congress.) Antonin Zapotocky" replaced 
Gottwald as president in 1953* while Antonin Novotny became First 
Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Novotny also acquired 
the presidency after Zapotocky's death in 1957* Novotny continued 
Gottwald's Stalinist policies until his ouster in January, 1968. 
Czechoslovak-Polish Agreements and Treaties, 19^6-1955 
During the Stalinist period, Czechoslovakia and Poland made 
concerted efforts to establish political and economic integration. 
Close political relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland continued 
until 1956, when Poland commenced her "independent road" to socialism. 
Since 1956, Czechoslovak-Polish relations have remained correct, 
although they have been strained.
The two states signed the following agreements and treaties 
during the period 19^+6-1955:
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1. January 24, 1946
Prague
2. February 12, 1946
Prague
3. March 3, 1947
Warsaw
4. July 4, 1947
Prague
5. March 23 and 27, 1948
Warsaw
6. April 5» 19^8
Warsaw
7. January 21, 1949
Warsaw
8. April 26, 1951
Warsaw
9. March 17, 1953
Prague
10. May 14, 1955 
Warsaw
Agreement concerning air 
communications
Agreement on the mutual return 
of property removed after the 
outbreak of the war
Treaty of Friendship, Collabora­
tion, and Mutual Assistance
Agreement on economic coopera­
tion; cultural agreement 
(two agreements)
Agreement on the valorization of 
custom rates
Agreement on cooperation in 
social policy and social 
administration
Treaty on mutual legal relations 
in civil and criminal matters
Trade and payments agreement for 
the period 1951-1955
Trade and payments agreement for 
1953
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw 
Pact)— Albania (expelled in 196 2), 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun­
gary, the German Democratic 
Republic, Poland, and the Soviet 
Union
The Czech Reaction to the "Polish October” of 1956
In February, 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev denounced 
Stalin as incompetent and a criminal at the Twentieth Soviet Party 
Congress in Moscow. The subsequent de-Stalinization efforts in the 
Soviet Union led to dramatic and violent popular demands for similar 
de-Stalinization measures in Poland and in Hungary.
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The Poznan Riots, June, 1956 
During the first six months of 1956, Poland was without an 
economic plan; a six-year plan had come to an end on December 31, 
1955, and the new five-year plan was not yet ready by mid-summer. 
The Polish economy was collapsing.
From 19^9 to 1955, the index of nominal wages rose from 
100 to 2 25.7 , and the official index of prices of consumer goods 
and services rose to 1?6.7. Prices of food and coal, both impor­
tant components in a Polish family's budget, rose sharply. 
Furthermore, the increases quoted were for prices prevailing on
the official market that supplied only a proportion of the
12population's needs.
Nearly 20,000 workers at ZISPO, the largest factory in 
Poznan, were becoming discontented with the economic conditions in 
Poland. Poznan, Poland's fourth largest city, suffered from a 
severe housing shortage, but a bread shortage in the city triggered 
the explosion.
On Thursday, June 28, 1956, the ZISPO workers decided to 
stage a demonstration. Carrying placards with "Vie want bread" and 
"We want lower prices and higher wages," the demonstrators marched 
peacefully through the Poznan streets to the Town Hall in Old Town. 
Other workers and pedestrians joined the ZISPO workers. The Poznan 
manifestation was the first strike to take place in Poland since 
1939.
The demonstration then acquired a revolutionary aspect. 
Demonstrators began to shout "Down with the Russians," "We want
V/
freedom," and "Down with the Soviet occupation," A frightened
security policeman then shot a woman and child, and spontaneous
rioting broke out, . The rioting spread throughout the city, and
troops and tanks were dispersed to the city to suppress the revolt,
Poznan became a battleground for two days. The world learned
instantaneously about the Poznan riots because many foreign-
correspondents were in Poznan covering the Poznan’ International 
13Trade Fair,
The riots in Poznan caused a great deal of consternation in 
the Polish government, Edward Ochab, who became First Secretary of 
the United Polish Workers' (Communist) Party after Bierut's death, 
was totally incapable of governing. Popular demands for a 
"broadening of democracy" in Poland were increasing. Popular demands 
for the release of Cardinal Wyszynski from prison were also voiced.
In August, 1956, one million Catholic Poles gathered at Czestochowa 
to honor the Black Madonna at the Jasna Gora monastery. This anti­
government Catholic manifestation was unprecedented in a Communist- 
run country. Eioting also broke out in Warsaw and other Polish 
cities. Because of the critical situation, the Polish government 
summoned W/adysXaw GomuXka who had been secretly released from 
prison in 1955•
The "Polish October"
In 19.^8* Oomu^ka was removed from his position as First 
Secretary of the United Polish Workers1 Party and imprisoned for 
"rightest-nationalist deviation," e. g., refusal to endorse the con­
struction pf a Communist society in Poland according to the Soviet
model. GomuXka preferred to build socialism in Poland according to
Polish conditions. For example, he opposed rapid collectivization
of Polish agriculture. 'GomuXka rejected charges that he opposed
close Polish relations with the Soviet Union, but he did admit that
l;ihe was against Soviet interference in Poland's domestic affairs. 
Because of his views, GomuXka enjoyed enormous popularity among 
the Poles. During the 1956 crisis, the future of Communism in
Poland depended solely on Gomu^ka's popularity.
The Polish reform movement under Gomu^ka's guidance, which 
became known as the "Polish October", resulted not only from the 
economic difficulties which ignited the Poznan riots, but also from 
the Polish desire to free Poland from tight Soviet control. The 
removal of Marshall Rokossovsky, the Russian head of the Polish 
army and the symbol of Soviet hegemony in Poland, from the Polish 
Politboro in October, 1956i marked a significant change in Polish- 
Soviet relations. However, Gomu/ka was cautious in his criticism 
of the Soviet Union in order to avoid Soviet military intervention 
which was threatening Poland in October and November. On October 
20, 1956, GomuXka spoke to the Polish nation over national radio. 
Referring to Polish relations with the Soviet Union, GomuXka stated
These relations ought to be based on mutual 
confidence and equality of rights, on mutual assistance, 
on mutual friendly criticism . . .  arising out of the 
spirit of friendship and socialism . . . and the right 
of every nation to rule itself in a sovereign manner in 
its own independent country ought to be fully and 
mutually respected.
The Party and all the people, who saw the evil 
that existed in the past and who sincerely desire to 
remove all that is left of that evil in our life today 
in order to strengthen the foundations of our system,
should give a determined rebuff to all the whisperings 
and all the voices which strive to weaken our friend­
ship with the Soviet Union. (Poor Polish-Soviet 
relations)— today this belongs to the irrevocable past.
. . .  And if there is anyone who thinks that it is 
possible to kindle antjpSoviet moods in Poland, then 
he is deeply mistaken.
The revolutionary atmosphere in Poland provoked the rebellion 
of mutual support among the Hungarians, traditionally linked to the 
Poles by firm bonds of friendship. However, Czechoslovakia remained 
quiet.
The Poles envied the Hungarians for their revolutionary 
activity because the Hungarians reminded them of their own insur­
rections against Russian hegemony in 179^, 1830-31, and 1863. In 
Warsaw, the following bitter statement was heard: "The Hungarians
are behaving like Poles (willingness to fight for a cause), the 
Poles like Czechs (preference for passive resistance), and the Czechs 
like swine (self-explanatory)."^ Traditional Polish contempt for 
the Czech national preference for passive resistance is obvious in 
the preceding statement.
The Czech Reaction 
Edward Taborsky and Ivo Duchai’ek believe that Czechoslovakia's
high standard of living was the most important factor in preventing
the outbreak of revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1936. The Czecho­
slovak standard of living in the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-
sixties was the highest in the socialist bloc, and Czechoslovakia
17was the "showcase" of socialism.
Indifference to the events in Czechoslovakia's two neighbor­
ing states predominated among the Czechs. Except for the 1953 PlzeS
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riots, which were ignited by currency reforms, the Czech workers 
did not show the explosive dissatisfaction with the Communist Party 
experienced in Poland and in Hungary. When Czech workers wished to 
manifest their dissatisfaction, they chose traditional non-violent 
Czech methods of protest such as passive resistance, occasional 
sit-down strikes, widespread absenteeism from work, and recurrent 
demands for the Party to fulfill its obligations.
The liberalization in Poland and the violence of the 
Hungarian Uprising strengthened the belief of the Zdipotocky- 
Novotny regime that the only hope for the retention of power in 
Czechoslovakia was through the increased intimidation of the Czech 
and the Slovak peoples as well as through dependence on Soviet 
military assistance.
As it became clear how Moscow reacted to the events in 
Poland, and especially in Hungary, the official party line in Prague 
turned grimly critical of the new "Titoism", and a harsh neo- 
Stalinism became the vogue. Novotny denounced national communism, 
the independent road to socialism, as an ally of the imperialists.
He rejected GomuXka's policies and declared that the "Leninist 
example remains for us the only binding example which is being 
applied creatively in different historic and socio-economic con­
ditions."^
In an effort to prevent the dissemination of liberal Polish 
ideas into Czechoslovakia, the regime closed the border with Poland 
as tightly as it was with the German Federal Republic. Polish radio 
was also jammed. The Czechoslovak regime remained extremely critical
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of GomuXka's policies, and Novotn/ regarded as heresy GomuXka's
19decision to abandon the collectivization of agriculture in Poland.
Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Relations, 19^-7-1971 
Resolution of the Teschen Dispute
On March 10, 19^+7, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed the 
Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration, and Mutual Assistance. This 
treaty called for close Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation, consulta­
tion on important international questions, a ban on alliances 
directed against a treaty partner, and a strengthening of political, 
economic, and cultural ties. Within the framework of this treaty, 
the Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Council was also created.
The Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Council called for joint 
Czech-Polish exploitation of the important Teschen industrial region, 
the source of bitter Czech-Polish conflict during the inter-war 
period as well as one of the factors which destroyed the Czecho­
slovak-Polish Confederation during the war. According to the 
agreement, the Poles were to concentrate on coal and steel produc­
tion, while the Czechs were to complement this through emphasis on
20engineering and industrial production.
By 1957, Czech-Polish cooperation in the formerly disputed 
Teschen region was excellent. In that year, Czechoslovakia and 
Poland signed a bilateral agreement in which the Czechs pledged to 
invest sixty-three million dollars worth of machinery into Polish 
coal mining in the Teschen region. The Czechs also agreed to invest 
twenty-five million dollars in Polish sulphur exploitation.
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Furthermore, the two states agreed to the decentralization of
contacts among the various Czech-Polish technical and administrative
agencies. This was the forerunner of the Inter-governmental
Commissions on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Collaboration
which led to a Czech investment in Polish copper mining in 1961
21as well as in a Polish fertilizer plant at Pu^awy.
The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
In January, 19^+9> the Soviet Union forced Czechoslovakia and 
Poland to join the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). 
Through Comecon, whose headquarters are located in Moscow, the Soviet 
Union maintains her economic hegemony throughout Eastern Europe, ' 
Comecon's original objective was defensive. Just as the 
Warsaw Pact was essentially designed to offset NATO, Eastern Europe's 
economic organization was instituted with the hope of counter­
acting the growing success of the European Economic Community in 
Western Europe, Particularly since 19551 Comecon's activities have 
increasingly reflected the twofold intention of the Soviet leader­
ship, namely to unite the Eastern European states firmly with the
Soviet Union through skillful exploitation of economic resources
(for example, the Soviet exploitation of Czechoslovakia's uranium 
and Poland's coal), and to keep the satellite economies in fair-to- 
prosperous shape to prevent revolutionary upsurges as in 1953-1956 
and 1 9 6 8 .22
As a part of the Comecon agreement, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland formed "Intermetal" in 196.3 to facilitate cooperation 
among the three states in iron and steel production.
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Czechoslovak-Polish Trade Relations
From 19̂ -8 to 19551 the development of Czechoslovak-Polish
trade relations within the realm of manufactured goods grew rapidly.
An even greater increase in trade of manufactured goods occurred
from 1957 to 1 9 6 2, when the growth level increased two and one-half
times over the preceding five-year period. In 1969, Poland ranked
third among Czechoslovakia's trading partners, behind the Soviet
Union and the German Democratic Republic. Czechoslovakia also
ranked third among Poland's trading partners, behind the Soviet
25Union and the German Democratic Republic.
In the thirty-year period since the end of the war, Poland 
has evolved from an agricultural-industrial state to an industrial- 
agricultural state as is Czechoslovakia. The sharp inter-war 
period diversity between Czechoslovakia and Poland within the realm 
of industrial production has diminished considerably in the post­
war period. (During the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was one 
of Europe's most heavily industrialized states, while Poland 
developed only rudimentary industrial growth.) Because of the 
increased emphasis on industrialization in Poland, Polish agricul­
tural exports to Czechoslovakia have decreased significantly, a
fact verified in the following statistics:
Polish commodities exported to Czechoslovakia:
1. machines and tools:. 19̂ -8 (0.5%), 1969 (55*2%)
2. consumer products: 19^8 (--- ), 1969 (15.2%)
5. agricultural
products: 19'+8 (26.1%), 1969 (5.9%)
5^
Within the realm of Polish exports to Czechoslovakia, the 
following finished industrial products are included: ball bearings,
electrical appliances, mining machinery, cranes, road building 
equipment, textile machinery, ships, pumps, agricultural machinery, 
commercial tools, electric industrial ovens, precision tools, 
automobiles (Polish Fiats), railway cars, and electrical parts. In 
1 9 6 9, Poland also built a sugar beet processing plant near Hroch'fiv 
Tynec for the annual processing of ^,000 tons of sugar beets.
Poland exports the following raw materials to Czechoslovakia: 
bituminous coal (approximately two million tons annually), zinc, 
caustic and calcine soda, dyes, and cement.
Polish agricultural exports to Czechoslovakia include the 
following products: potatoes, fruits, vegetables, seafood, meat,
and vodka*
Polish consumer goods exported to Czechoslovakia include the 
following items: textiles, sewing machines, furniture, zippers,
sports equipment, bicycles, radios and televisions, refrigerators, 
and cosmetics.
Poland has also made available to Czechoslovakia port
facilities in Szczecin as well as free navigation on the Oder River
25for 30,000 tons of cargo annually.
Because the standard of living in Czechoslovakia is about 
20 to 25 percent higher than in Poland (See footnote 22.), Czecho­
slovakia does not export as many goods to Poland as Poland does to 
Czechoslovakia. Machinery and tools comprise about two-thirds of 
Czechoslovakia's exports to Poland. The machinery and tool products.
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include the following items: ball bearings, electrical tools,
mining equipment, textile machinery, machinery for shoe production, 
machinery for the manufacture of rubber and artificial products, 
automobiles (Czech ^kodas), trucks, buses, medical equipment, and 
motorcycles (Jawas), precision tools, industrial equipment, air 
compressors, pumps, cranes, and office equipment,
Czechoslovakia exports the following raw materials to 
Poland:: crude oil, porcelain clay, magnesite, chemicals, and
cellulose products.
Within the realm of consumer goods, Czechoslovakia exports 
the following products to Poland: shoes, pharmaceuticals, arti­
ficial jewellery (in 196%  3 *3 million zlotys in value), cosmetics, 
musical instruments, sports equipment, dry goods, and glassware.
On March 2, 1971* in Prague, the Czechs and the Poles signed
a five-year plan (1971-1975) for the exchange of goods. This five-
year trade agreement foresaw the increase in exchange values of up
2(Sto 73 percent from the previous agreement of 1966-1 9 7 0.
The "spillover" theory— lack of validity in 
th e case of Czechoslovakia and Poland
The "spillover" theory cited in Chapter I states that
excellent relations between two states in the economic sphere may 
"spillover" into the political sphere and lead to political inte­
gration. As the above section indicates, Czechoslovakia and Poland 
have enjoyed excellent economic relations since 19^7. However, the 
Czechs and the Poles have remained distant in the political sphere, 
and it appears that the political distance will continue to exist.
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Czechoslovakia's and Poland's foreign policies are dictated 
from Moscow* Therefore, despite the fact that the diplomatic 
relations between the two satellite states are correct, the old 
mutual prejudices and jealousies have remained. One can conclude 
that the "spillover" theory has no validity in the case of 
Czechoslovak-Polish relations.
During the period of this chapter (19^5-1967)$ the distance 
between the Czechoslovak and Polish governments and people during 
the 1956 crisis has already been examined. That distance repeated 
itself during the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, to be discussed 
in the following chapter.
However, other data from the 19^5-1967 period allow one to 
conclude that the Czechs and the Poles have remained politically 
distant. The data include the following: (l) belated Czechoslovak
endorsement of the Rapacki Plan in 1957, and (2) travel restric­
tions between Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Belated Czechoslovak endorsement of the Rapacki Plan
On October 2, 19571 Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki 
proposed before the United Nations General Assembly his plan for a 
nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The purpose of the plan was 
to prevent the German Federal Republic from obtaining atomic weapons.
The proposed zone was to include Czechoslovakia, Poland, the 
German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic. The 
states included in the nuclear-free zone were to pledge, not to 
manufacture, maintain or import for their own use, and not to per­
mit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type,
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as well as any installations and equipment designed for servicing 
nuclear weapons, including missile-launching equipment. The 
nuclear powers at that time (the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and the Soviet Union) were also to pledge not to uee 
nuclear weapons against the zone. The United States formally 
rejected the plan in October, 1961.
When Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed his plan 
for an atom-free zone in Central Europe on October 2, 1957, the 
Czechoslovak government showed complete indifference toward the 
proposal. Despite the fact that it was to Czechoslovakia's 
advantage to support such a plan in light of Czechoslovakia's 
critical geographical situation, the Novotny regime refused to 
endorse the Rapacki Plan. However, after "months of quiet
persuasion" from the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak government
27officially endorsed the Polish proposal on December 14, 1957«
It appears that Czechoslovakia's refusal to endorse the 
Rapacki Plan verifies the premise that despite the fact that 
Czechoslovak-Polish diplomatic relations are correct, the old 
Czech and Polish prejudices and jealousies have remained. 
Furthermore, one may conclude that Czechoslovakia's endorsement of 
the Rapacki Plan did not evolve from a willingness to endorse the 
Polish government's attempt to create a nuclear-free zone in 
Central Europe, but rather from the Novotny regime's reluctance to 
jeopardize relations with its chief ally, the Soviet Union.
Novotny's obedie.nce to the Soviet Union in the case of the 
• Rapacki Plan stands as an indication that Czechoslovakia was one of
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the Soviet Union's most faithful Eastern European satellites during 
the nineteen-fifties and early nineteen-sixties. Strong Czecho­
slovak loyalty to the Soviet Union during that period evolved from 
the historical Czech amity toward Russia.
Travel restrictions between Czechoslovakia and Poland
In 1963, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed an agreement to 
allow Czechoslovak and Polish tourists easy access to border resorts 
without a passport. However, in 1965» further travel restrictions 
between the two states were imposed. After the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, harsher travel restrictions between the two states
were added, and those restrictions have not been relaxed since that
2 8time. Travel between Czechoslovakia and Poland now requires not 
only a passport, but also a visa.
The travel restrictions between the two states are a means 
by which the Communist regimes in Prague and Warsaw maintain their 
power base, by preventing the dissemination of ideas across the 
Czechoslovak-Polish border. The lack of travel between Czechoslovakia 
and Poland has had the effect of not allowing greater contact 
between the Czechs and the Poles. Therefore, a subsequent lack of 
communication ensues, and the old mutual Czech-Polish prejudices, 
jealousies, and misunderstandings are preserved. This lack of 
communication explains in part the general failure of the Czechs to 
comprehend the 1956 events in Poland as well as the corresponding 
general lack of understanding in Poland concerning the 1968 events 
in Czechoslovakia. The I968 events in Czechoslovakia are the 
subject of the following chapter.
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C H A P T E R  I V
THE ROLE OF THE "PRAGUE SPRING" AND THE 1968 INVASION OF CZECHO­
SLOVAKIA IN CZECHOSLOVAK-POLISH RELATIONS
The purpose of this chapter is not to narrate the entire 
history of the "Prague Spring" and the subsequent Soviet-led Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Instead, the purpose of this 
chapter is primarily to examine the following factors: (l) the
reasons for Polish participation in the invasion and the Czech reac­
tion to that participation, (2 ) the destruction of the historical 
Czech amity toward Russia, and (3) the general lack of protest in 
Poland vis-a-vis the Polish government's decision to intervene 
militarily in Czechoslovakia.
The Causes of the "Prague Spring", 1956-1967
Protest Among the Intellectuals
After Stalin's death, undercurrents of discontent began to 
appear in Czechoslovakia, especially among the writers and intel­
lectuals. In 1956, the Novotny regime crushed resistance through the 
dismissals of dissidents from the Party and from employment.
However, by the end of the nineteen-fifties and the middle 
of the nineteen-sixties, the writers and the intellectuals resur­
faced to demand greater literary expression in their works. The 
existential philosophy of Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard 
began to rival Marxist philosophy. Cabarets, mime shows, and Black 
Theatres appeared throughout the country, and the performers spiced 
their acts with political criticisms of the Novotny" regime. Czecho-
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Slovak cinema during the nineteen-sixties also began to experiment
with new techniques and was renowned throughout the world. Two
Czechoslovak films, Jan Kadar's The Shop on Main Street and Jira
Menzel's Closely Watched Trains, won Oscars as "Best Foreign Film"
1in 1964 and 1 9 6 6, respectively.
The Union of Czechoslovak Writers, the Union of Slovak 
Writers, and the Union of Slovak Journalists became the spokesmen 
of publicly expressed disdain of, and opposition to, the Czechoslo­
vak regime. By 1 9 6 6, several cultural and literary periodicals had 
developed as significant vehicles of party criticism. The most 
famous of these periodicals was Literarni noviny, the forerunner of 
the "Prague Spring's" mouthpiece Literarni listy.
The Slovak literary movement developed in the early nineteen- 
sixties in an attempt to acquire greater national identification 
within the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The Slovak writers 
accentuated Czech wrongs committed against the Slovaks. (During 
the inter-war period, the Czechs treated the Slovaks as second-class 
citizens and dominated the bureaucracy in Slovakia. As a result of 
Slovak demands for a separate Slovak state, Slovakia became a quasi­
independent state allied to Nazi Germany from 1939 until the Slovak 
Uprising in 1944. Under the I960 Czechoslovak constitution, the 
autonomous rights of the Slovak parliament were almost liquidated 
and the Bratislava Cabinet was abolished. Bratislava lost its 
status as the capital of Slovakia, and regional authorities in cen­
tral Slovakia became directly subordinated to the central government 
in Prague.) Intellectual ferment among both Slovak and Czech writers
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culminated at the June, 1967, Fourth Congress of the Writers' Union
where the writers blasted the government for its anti-Israeli stance
2and demanded the termination of censorship in literature.
It was at the Congress of the Writers' Union that Ludvik 
Vaculik denounced the Party for lack of leadership and for hypoc­
risy. (In June, 1968, Vaculxk \vrote the famous declaration "Two 
Thousand Words" which demanded further democratization in Czecho­
slovakia during the "Prague Spring".) In his speech, Vaculik 
unknowingly predicted the horror and apathy of post-invasion 
Czechoslovakia: "If the government is allowed to stand permanently,
the citizens will suffer. Not all will lose their lives, but the 
fall of many will be followed by the relapse of perhaps the whole
3nation into fear, political apathy, and civic resignation. . . . "
. Czechoslovak Economic Stagnation 
In 1963, the Czechoslovak national income dropped by 2.8 
percent, the volume of output by 0 .7  percent and productivity by 
1.4 percent in relation to the previous year. Even though the 
third Five-Year Plan for 1961-1965 was supposed to have raised the 
national income by 42 percent, industrial output by 36 percent and 
agricultural output by 22 percent, the period revealed that the 
national income grew by only 10 percent and industrial output by 
29 percent, while ag-ricultural output dropped by 0.4 percent.+ 
Economic reform became obvious.
In 1964, the Party approved some principles of reform
Vadvanced by Czechoslovakia's foremost economist, Ota Sik, the head
vof the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences. Sik deplored
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the blind orthodoxy which favored investment in heavy industry 
regardless of costs, the neglect and sacrifice of quality to quantity 
in industrial production, the unwillingness to experiment with profit 
incentives and autonomy of decision-making at the plant level, and 
the indifference to technological-scientific innovation and labor 
productivity in the labor economy.
Sik argued that Czechoslovakia had to make more extensive 
use of profit incentive, autonomy of decision-making at the plant 
level, and foreign trade. He believed that Czechoslovakia could 
achieve more by buying machinery and selling consumer goods abroad 
rather than vice versa. Trade with the West was a major orientation
of Sik's economic plan.
1/Sik favored increased trade with the German Federal Republic, 
but he did not advocate Czechoslovakia’s withdrawal from Comecon.
&ik designed his economic reforms to ameliorate the stagnated economy 
in Czechoslovakia through the adoption of economic principles suited 
specifically to Czechoslovakia's conditions.
VHowever, Sik's advocacy of closer relations with the German 
Federal Republic provoked widespread consternation among the conser­
vative Communist regimes in Poland, the German Democratic Republic, 
and the Soviet Union. Gomu^ka, Ulbricht, and Brezhnev, respectively, 
felt that Czechoslovak rapprochement with the P’ederal Republic would 
weaken both Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, destroy Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe, and undermine the unpopular GomuXka and Ulbricht 
regimes. The perceived threat of the German Federal Republic was 
one of the factors which precipitated the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
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Prague Student Demonstration
As a result of a governmental decision to employ plastics 
instead of copper in electrical cables in the Strahov student dormi­
tories in Prague, students suffered from both a lack of light for 
study and a lack of heat. Frequent written protests accomplished 
nothing.
During the evening of October 30, 1967, the students in the 
Strahov dormitory complex staged a demonstration to protest against 
the lack of electricity and heat. About 2,500 students marched 
through the.streets of the Strahov district in Prague carrying 
candles and shouting "We want light." The police, who thought that 
the demonstration was against the Central Committee which was in 
extraordinary session on that particular evening, attacked the student 
demonstrators. Students were beaten with truncheons, tear gas was 
used, and several students were hospitalized.^ Even though the 
police quickly suppressed the student demonstration, it proved to be 
the death knoll for the antiquated Novotny regime.
Thus, Slovak nationalist grievances, demands for increased 
literary expression, economic stagnation, and a brief student demon­
stration brought an end to Novotny's lengthy rule in Czechoslovakia.
On January 1, 1968, Novotny addressed the Central Committee for the 
last time as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
On January 6 , 1 9 6 8, Alexander Dub£ek, the former First Secretary of 
the Slovak Communist Party and a compromise choice, was elected 
First Secretary to replace Novotny. Dubcek became the first Slovak 
to hold the position of First Secretary of the national party. On
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March 22, 1968, Novotny was also forced to abdicate the presidency 
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. General Ludvik Svobpda 
replaced Novotny as president and served in that function until 
May, 1975.
In the same manner that popular revolt, literary criticism 
of the regime, demands for increased freedom of expression, and 
economic stagnation in Poland resulted in GomuXka's coming to power 
in 1956♦ so Slovak demands for increased autonomy, literary criti­
cism of the regime* demands for increased freedom of expression, 
and economic stagnation in Czechoslovakia brought Dub^ek to power 
in 1968. If popular dissent had not existed, one can assume that 
neither GomuXka nor Dubtfek, both Communist reformers, would have 
come to power at all. The conservative Communist dictators Bierut 
and Novotny possessed only one ambition which was to preserve their 
power base at any cost. Their subsequent losses of power resulted 
from their refusal not only to liberalize the Communist system in 
their respective states, but also from their wanton contempt and 
disregard for popular demands for increased freedom of expression 
and an improved standard of living. Therefore, even though GomuXka 
and Dubcek attempted to reform the system from within the confines 
of the Communist Party, they secured their positions of power only 
as a direct result of popular revolts within their respective states. 
Furthermore, their reforms resulted from popular demands for 
increased democratization of the Communist system of government.
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The "Prague Spring;"
Dubcek* s coming to power in Czechoslovakia marked a new era 
in the history of both Czechoslovakia and the world Communist move­
ment. During the eight month period from January until the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20, 1968, Czechoslovak 
citizens enjoyed their greatest breath of freedom since thê  19^8 
coup d'etat. In an attempt to create "socialism with a human face" 
in Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek forces, pushed by widespread popular 
demands, introduced innovations into the Communist system of govern­
ment which not even Gomu/ka had permitted during the brief "Polish 
October" of 1956.
The most important innovation was the removal of press 
censorship in June, 1968. Because of that decision, the Czechoslovak 
press became a forum for widespread political debate. Criticism of
ithe Communist government during the Stalinist period and popular 
demands for an official clarification of Jan Masaryk's 19̂ -8 death 
appeared in the uncensored Czechoslovak press. Political discussions 
in the press also examined the possibilities of a multi-party 
system, a parliamentary opposition, and completely free elections.
The Dubcek government abolished the Czechoslovak secret 
police apparatus early in the period. The government also revoked 
travel restrictions for Czechoslovak citizens, and many Czechs and 
Slovaks visited the V/est during the period of the reforms.
Political interest groups developed, the most famous of which 
was K231, a group of former political prisoners. KAN, the Club of 
Involved Non-Party Members, was also formed to demand further
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democratization in Czechoslovakia from the Dubcek government*
However, the Czechoslovak Communist Party refused to endorse the
existence of the contesting political entities.
Spontaneity and good will marked the 1968 May Day parade in
Prague. An estimated ^00,000 Czechs and enthusiastic foreigners,
in Czechoslovakia to observe the reform movement, crowded the streets
in a disorderly fashion.
For the first time since 19^7, Czech residents of Plzen
raised an American flag and played The Star-Spangled Banner in the
city square to honor the twenty-third anniversary of the American
nliberalization of their city from the Nazis on May 6 , 19^5*
Dubcek attempted to conduct a middle-of-the-road course in 
his reforms of the system, However, popular demands to accelerate 
the reforms complicated the situation for Dubcek. The most 
striking demand for the continuation of democratization in Czecho­
slovakia was Vaculfk's "Two Thousand Words". On June 28, 1968, the 
Presidium condemned the declaration as counterrevolutionary, but 
later reversed its decision.
The Presidium's condemnation of the "Two Thousand Words" 
indicated that a cogent conservative element remained in Czechoslo­
vakia to pressure Dubcek to maintain a neutral course and not to 
accelerate the reforms of the "Prague Spring". Dubcek's middle-of- 
the-road policies satisfied neither the liberals nor the 
conservatives.
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The Official Polish Reaction to the "Prague Spring"
During the May Day celebration in Warsaw, GomuXka, the former 
champion of "democratic" Communism in Poland and at that time 
embroiled in a bitter fight with Mieczys^aw Moczar over the leader­
ship of the United Polish Workers' Party, attacked the Czechoslovak 
reformers as "alleged champions of freedom and democracy" who are in 
fact "reactionaries and backward elements, preachers of anti­
communist ideology, waging a struggle against socialism not only
8with us, but also with other socialist countries."
Out of fear that the Czechoslovak reform movement would 
prove to be contagious in Poland, the Polish government commenced on 
May 5, 1968, a virulent press attack on the reform movement in 
Czechoslovakia.
In the Polish press attacks on the Czechoslovak reforms,
the government played upon the traditional Polish prejudice that the
Czechs are pro-German. This prejudice has evolved from the fact
that many Czechs speak German, and also because Czech culture and
language were almost liquidated during the three hundred years of
Austrian hegemony in Bohemia. The Poles have always resented the
Czechs for the latter's national preference for passivity when
confronted with a more powerful foe. The small number of Czechs
who perished during the Second World War, compared to the enormous
Polish loss of six million persons, rekindled the Polish prejudice
that the Czechs are pro-German because the Poles felt that the
Czechs had collaborated with the Nazis to remain alive.
✓The Polish press intentionally misinterpreted Sik's goal to
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augment Czechoslovakia's trade relations with the German Federal 
Republic. The Polish press reported to its Polish audience that 
the Czechs and the Slovaks wished to withdraw from Comecon and the 
Warsaw Pact which would have left Poland vulnerable to a perceived 
West German attack from the south. (The memories of Nazi occupa­
tion and Nazi crimes in Poland still predominate among the Poles, 
and the perceived threat of the German Federal Republic is stronger 
than is the Federal Republic's actual strength.)
The following interpretation of the events in Czechoslovakia 
is taken from a document circulated among members of the United 
Polish Workers' Party. The document accentuates the alleged 
Czechoslovak withdrawal from the socialist bloc, Czech anti-Polish 
sentiments, and the perceived threat to the socialist movement:
On May 6 , the Ambassador of the Polish People's 
Republic in Prague • . . sent a note to the Czechoslovak 
government protesting against the anti-Polish and anti­
socialist character of the Czechoslovak press, radio, 
and television. Enemies of the Polish People's Republic 
and of our Party . . . are an expression of anti-social­
ist strength which has appeared in the last few months.
The direction of the Czechoslovak Communist Party has 
become fragmented. . . .  The revisionist group wishes to 
liquidate the people's government, to return Czecho­
slovakia to a liberal-bourgeois form of government, and 
to remove Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp and 
ally her with the German Federal Republic . . .
It is clear that the events in Czechoslovakia 
are not exclusively the internal affair of a brother 
country. . . .  The course of events in Czechoslovakia 
is of crucial importance to the security of Poland and 
the other socialist countries as well as of the position 
of socialist strength in Europe. . . .  (May 7, 1968)
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The Polish Student Riots of January-March, 1968
Background, 1956-1968 
A few months after having taken power, GomuXka saw the 
Stalinists as less harmful to him than those who demanded the com­
plete liquidation of Stalinism in Poland. In October, 1956,
GomuXka did not change the entire composition of the Polish govern­
ment because almost all of the Stalinists from the nineteen- 
forties and nineteen-fifties remained in power. Therefore, 
Stalinism in Poland was not liquidated, but rather only weakened.
During the succeeding years, many of the Stalinists removed 
from power in the "Polish October" of 1956 returned to their former 
positions and governed as they had previously. They did not call 
themselves Stalinists, but simply changed their methods of beha­
vior. Therefore, Poland entered her period of "neo-Stalinism" 
under Gomu^ka, the man with whom the Polish people had had so much 
faith in his being a "democratic" Communist.
Economic difficulties also became prevalent in Poland about 
1959* The economic uncertainties caused a great deal of animosity 
among the Poles toward their government. During the nineteen- 
sixties, the Polish economic situation worsened considerably. The 
costs of the most important staples (apartments, communications, 
meat, and bread) all rose in price. Poland's rapid post-war 
economic development was halted.^
The strength of the Polish secret police also began to 
redevelop after 1956. The secret police became an integral part of
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the Party and the governmental structure and appeared in all levels
of Polish political, economic, and cultural life.'*"'*'
The neo-Stalinists identified socialism with the total
control of each individual citizen. The neo-Stalinist ideal was to
create a totalitarian society, a police state. The man in control
of the internal security network was Mieczys/aw Moczar.
Moczar began to interfere in the operation of areas not of
his direct concern, e. g., decisions about Polish export quotas.
Moczar's domination of and influence within the governmental
structure provoked consternation and numerous protests among Polish
writers, intellectuals, and students.
Party elites guided the Polish government, and the secret
police and Party apparatus supported the elites. All of these
groups were not concerned with the interests of the Polish working
class. The elites were in total control of the Polish economic
situation, while the Polish population had absolutely no influence
on any decisions. The Polish working class lost all control of
12events in Poland and was reduced to a role of labor strength.
The elites opposed the notion of democratizing the system 
because it would have led to a limitation of their absolute power. 
Membership in the elitist structure was not guaranteed through 
knowledge, skill, or moral qualifications; the most crucial factor 
for consideration was loyalty. Therefore, it was not surprising 
that those persons who belonged to the elite in Poland feared the 
idea of democratization which was taking place in Czechoslovakia 
in 1968. Gomu^ka regarded the events in Czechoslovakia as a genuine
7^
threat to his. own power base in Poland,
The March Events
The March events of 1968 in Poland resulted directly from 
a power struggle between Gomu/ka and Moczar within the hierarchy 
of the United Polish Workers' Party. The personal game-playing 
occurred because of efforts to improve the political and economic 
situation in Poland. However, the Polish people's increasing 
distrust of the governing apparatus became evident. Numerous voices 
of protest began to appear within the intellectual community which 
demanded greater freedom of expression. The intellectuals and 
writers demanded widespread economic reforms and the removal of 
the Party .from the governmental structure.
The spark came in January, 1968. In January, the government, 
influenced by the Moczar forces, banned further performances of 
Dziady (The Forefathers' Eve), Adam Mickiewicz's play about Poland's 
fight for independence from Tsarist Russia and a masterpiece of 
Polish literature. The play's production was ordered stopped because 
the anti-Russian tone of the play was considered to be offensive 
to the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw. However, this Moczar accusation 
was a blatant falsehood because Moczar's forces, involved in the 
power struggle against Gomu^ka, prepared the withdrawal of Dziady 
as a means by which to provoke demonstrations against the GomuXka 
government.
University students protested fiercely against the govern­
ment's decision to ban the performances of Dziady; they entered the 
streets of Warsaw and demanded the liquidation of censorship. The
students did not demand any changes within the economic or the 
political spheres. Several students listed on a previously prepared 
list were arrested.
The Warsaw student population stood in the defense of their 
arrested colleagues. Three thousand one hundred forty-five Warsaw 
students signed a letter of protest addressed to the Sejm (parlia­
ment). The letter demanded the end of censorship and the release 
of the arrested students, but the Se.jm did nothing.
The official Polish press attributed the student protests
to "hooliganism" and to nationalistic and anti-Soviet sentiments,
14thereby legitimizing the students' arrests.
In March, 1968, two students at Warsaw University were 
arrested, and no reasons for the arrests were given. On March 8 ,
1968, Warsaw University students gathered on the main square of 
the university to protest against the illegal arrests. An agree­
ment to disperse was achieved between the students and the rector, 
Professor Rybicki. As the students began to leave the university 
square, the police entered the university grounds and began to 
beat and arrest the students. The illegal police attack on the 
Warsaw University students ignited further manifestations of 
student solidarity in Warsaw which in turn provoked student riots 
at other universities throughout Poland.
The Warsaw students began to shout "Long live Czechoslovakia!, 
"Poland awaits her own Dubcek!," and "Freedom!" These .chants 
indicated that the Polish demonstrators were aware of the growing 
liberalization in Czechoslovakia despite an almost complete blackout
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15on news of any significance from Prague.
However, the liberalization program in Czechoslovakia did 
not provoke the student riots in Warsaw and later throughout 
Poland. The riots were carefully planned within the higher eche­
lons of the internal security system, specifically by Moczar. When 
the students demanded their "own Dubcek," they were not supporting 
the Czechs out of any feelings of friendship for the Czechs. Czech- 
Polish amity simply does not exist. Instead, the Polish students 
wished only to possess the entity which the Czechs possessed, e. g., 
freedom of expression without the threat of police reprisals.
The Polish student population in March, 1968, was not 
prepared for the riots and protests which the Moczar forces had 
prepared in advance. During the initial stages of the March events, 
the students demanded only the removal of censorship in Poland, the 
right to show Dziady in Warsaw, and the liberation of their 
imprisoned friends. They forwarded no other demands to the govern­
ment. Unfortunately, the workers and other Polish citizens did 
not support the students during their quickly suppressed protest.
In conclusion, there was one other result of the March 
events. In order to explain the March events to the Polish people, 
the government found a scapegoat, the Jewish population in Poland. 
Blaming the Jews, for the outbreak of student riots throughout the 
country, the government began to persecute Jewish citizens in Poland 
in scenes reminiscent of the terror the Jews endured during the 
Nazi occupation of Poland. The government also forced Jews from 
their jobs and purged them from the Party. Because of the perse­
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cution, 20,000 Polish Jews applied for emigration to Israel and 
other countries. The purge- also affected Gomu/ka's own Jewish wife, 
who emigrated to Israel.^
The Invasion of Czechoslovakia
The Termination of the Historical Czech Amity toward Russia 
After threats and then promises to honor Czechoslovakia's 
sovereignty (the Warsaw Ultimatum, the Bratislava Conference, and 
the meeting at Cierna-nad-Tisou), troops from the Soviet Union, 
Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria 
entered Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20, 1968. The threat 
of democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia and the perceived threat 
of West German "revanchism" in Eastern Europe precipitated the 
invasion. The Soviet Union later defended the invasion with the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, which states that the Soviet Union has the right 
and the obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of another 
socialist state when socialism is threatened in that particular 
state. The Brezhnev Doctrine is in Appendix B.
President Svoboda ordered the Czechoslovak army not to 
mobilize to defend Czechoslovakia against the aggressors. Further­
more, he requested that Czechoslovak citizens not resist the 
invading troops. However, resistance, both active and passive, did 
occur and the invading troops became rapidly demoralized. On the
first day of the invasion, eighteen innocent Czechs were killed and
17307 wounded in Prague alone.
During the August 20 evening meeting of the Presidium at
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Hradcany Castle, Dub£ek was informed about the treacherous Warsaw 
Pact invasion of his homeland. It was then that he uttered his 
famous lament:: "This is my own personal tragedy, I have always
loved Russia. I have devoted my entire life to co-operating with
-j g
the Soviet Union, and this is what they have done to me!"
Given the traditional Czech and Slovak admiration for 
Russia, Dubtfek's tragic statement is not difficult to understand. 
The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia obliterated 
the traditional Czech amity toward Russia. Many Czechs watched 
in horror as Russian troops murdered innocent family members and 
friends. Russia's betrayal of Czechoslovakia was too perverse for 
many Czechs and Slovaks such as Dubcek to comprehend.
The following statements are examples of Czech anti-Russian 
graffiti found on Prague buildings. They reveal the intensity of 
the Czechs' hatred for.the Russians: RUSSIAN CIRCUS IN TOWN! DO
NOT FEED THE ANIMALS.; THE GERMANS WANTED US FOR ONLY ONE THOU­
SAND YEARS ; THE RUSSIANS FOREVER.; HOME, DOGS! OUR NATION VEEPS.; 
BREZHNEV! COMPARED TO YOU GENGHIS KHAN NEVER EXISTED.; EXCHANGE 
WANTED: SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK FRIENDSHIP FOR ANY OTHER PORNOGRAPHY.;
CALLING DR. BARNARD! HELP!!! DR. BREZHNEV HAS JUST TRANSPLANTED 
THE HEART OF EUROPE INTO THE BEHIND OF RUSSIA.; EVEN HITLER INVADED 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN DAYLIGHT.; PRotf?=POCHEMU?=POURQUOI?=WHY?19
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Czech Reaction to Polish Participation in the 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia
In light of the destruction of the traditional Czech amity 
toward Russia, an historical issue of contention between the Czechs 
and the Poles, an opportunity for Czech-Polish rapprochement 
existed. Cooperation among Czech and Polish intellectuals did 
occur briefly in 196 8. Those intellectuals included writers 
Goldsttlcker, Kohout, Prochazka, and Lustig among the Czechs, and 
novelists Andrzejewski and Mrozek among the Poles.
However, that opportunity perished because Polish troops 
also participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Two Polish 
military actions in Czechoslovakia within the span of thirty years 
(1938 and 1 9 6 8) have been bitter pills for the Czechs to swallow. 
Polish participation in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia only 
reinforced traditional Czech prejudice toward Poland.
Polish tourists in Czechoslovakia reported that Czechs
treated them with overt hostility. According to Radio Warsaw
(August 27, 1968), Czechs stoned Polish buses and cars and insulted -
their passengers. Radio Warsaw declared: "Tourists speaking Polish
risk being ostentatiously refused service in the shops. The
extraordinary thing is that German-speaking people get fast and
polite service. Instances of thefts of cars marked PI (Polska
Ludowa, the international automotive insignia for Poland) are 
,,20increasing."
Demoralization and malaise developed quickly among the 
Polish troops in Czechoslovakia because the troops felt that they 
had no right to enter Czechoslovak territory within the confines of
military aggression. Several Polish soldiers even deserted and
21returned to Poland. In the Czech town of Ji£xn, two lonely, 
demoralized, and drunken Polish soldiers opened fire on two local 
couples sitting on a park bench. They killed one of the boys, 
wounded one of the girls, killed the other boy's mother and wounded 
his father when they came out to see what was happening, killed a 
Polish soldier who tried to quell the slaughter, and wounded 
another Polish soldier, a Czech soldier, and a woman in a passing 
car. This unprovoked, unnecessary, and tragic Polish slaughter 
became known as "The Ji£xn Massacre of 1968."^
Polish Reaction to Polish Participation in the 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia
The repressions in Poland which took place after the March 
events broke the back of the Polish opposition which had looked to 
the reforms in Czechoslovakia with hope and expectation. The post- 
March repressions eliminated the possibility of a widespread 
emotional response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia as was found 
in Poland during the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. The average Pole had 
mixed feelings such as bewilderment, shame, or relief that the 
German Federal Republic would not threaten Polish security. Tra­
ditional anti-Czech prejudices and antipathies also played a role 
in explaining the general passivity of the Polish population. The
following comment was often heard in Poland: "At last the Czechs
23have, had it as well!" This statement refers to the fact that 
the Russians finally suppressed freedom in Czechoslovakia, as they 
had done previously in Poland and in Hungary.
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Protests against Poland's participation in the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia came mostly from the most articulate and best 
educated strata of Polish society, the students and the intellectu­
als* The protesters expressed themselves through the distribution 
of pro-Czechoslovak leaflets which attacked the Polish government 
on moral grounds, much as American students protested against 
United States involvement in Vietnam on moral grounds. The 
following leaflet accentuated Poland's disgrace in the eyes of the 
world because of her participation in the invasion of Czechoslo­
vakia:'
On the night of August 20-21, 1968, the armies 
of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, and the Soviet Union commenced criminal 
aggression g>n socialist Czechoslovakia. Poland's 
participation in that criminal aggression is a conse­
quence of the politics realized during the past few 
years in our country. The same forces which massacred 
the workers in Poznan and bloodily crushed the revolu­
tion in Hungary in 1956, destroyed the achievements of 
the "Polish October" through the practice of anti­
socialist policies, the forces which in March of this 
year brutally suppressed the students— today wishes to 
silence the democratic process in Czechoslovakia.
The Polish army's occupation of Zaolzie during 
Hitler's partition of Czechoslovakia was shameful.
The participation of the Polish army in the present 
aggression is also shameful. Shame on the aggressors! 
Czechoslovakia, you are not alone!
The occupation of. the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic threatens peace in the world and is a return 
to Stalinism and a blow to the hopes of democracy in 
Poland. Shame on the Polish uniform! Boycott Poland 
in the entire world! Poles, demand the withdrawal of 
the occupation army from Czechoslovakia and the 
termination of interference in Czechoslovakia's inter­
nal affairs. We demand democratic socialism and 
freedom! The affair of the Czechs and the Slovaks is 
also our affair.
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The invasion of Czechoslovakia reaffirmed the tragedy of 
Eastern Europe--the failure of the small Eastern European countries 
to understand their mutual dependence. In 1 9 6 8, as in 1956, as in 
1938, as in 1919-1 9 2 0, petty quarrels, divisiveness, and terri­
torial ambitions among the Eastern European nations contributed to 
their national tragedies. Any attack on one or more of the 
Eastern European states by an outside power such as Germany or 
Russia has:been used by the other Eastern European nations to 
advance their own interests at the expense of the victim(s). In 
19.19, during a period of Polish weakness, Czech troops entered 
Poland to acquire control of the important coal mining region at 
Teschen. In 1920, during the Polish-Soviet war, the Czechs 
refused to allow the transit of French arms to Poland. In 1938, 
Poland and Hungary participated in the dismemberment of Czecho­
slovakia. The bloodbath in Hungary In 1956 provoked widespread 
sympathy in Poland, but only indifference in Czechoslovakia. Both 
the Hungarians and the Poles attempted to break away from the 
Soviet yoke in 1956, but failed. Should the Czechs and the Slovaks 
have succeeded in 1968 when the others had not?
The aggressive, short-sighted, and brutal actions of the 
Eastern European authoritarian governments have been reinforced 
time and time again by the negative attitudes of the Eastern 
European peoples for their neighbors. Mutual Czech-Polish 
animosities and cultural prejudices represent only one of those 
negative attitudes. Unfortunately, the role of Polish participa­
tion in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was to reinforce the
traditional Czech enmity toward the Poles
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C H A P T E R  V 
CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters of this study have attempted to show 
that the Czechs and the Poles command a lengthy history of mutual 
cultural prejudice, distaste, jealousy, animosity, and misunder­
standing. All of these factors have existed for centuries, even 
prior to the foundations of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Polish 
Republic in 1918. Despite the imposition of Communism in both 
states after the end of the Second World War, the Czech and Polish 
peoples as well as their corresponding governments have continued 
to manifest their negative attitudes through either overt hostility 
or total indifference toward the other. Relations between the 
Czechs and the Poles are somewhat analogous to relations between the 
Americans and the Canadians, e. g., proper but distant. The lack 
of an open border between the two satellite states has ensured the 
preservation of the ancient animosities and mutual cultural 
prejudices. The poor relations between the Czechs and the Poles 
have continued to exist after the invasion of Czechoslovakia which 
reinforced traditional Czech enmity toward the Poles.
The Czech Reaction to Gierek*s Liberalization in Poland
On December 13, 1970, the GomuXka government announced its 
decision to raise food prices. On December l̂ f, workers in Gdansk, 
rioted to protest against the decision. Riots in the other Baltic 
port cities of Gdynia, Szczecin, and Ebl^g followed the Gdansk riots.
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On December 15, GomuXka, in an effort to preserve his power base, 
committed a grave error and ordered that tanks suppress the revolt. 
On December 18, GomuXka suffered a minor stroke during an argu­
ment within the Politboro with members opposed to his decision to 
employ force. On December 19, after seven hours of debate, the 
Politboro requested that GomuXka resign. On December 20, the VII 
Plenary session of the United Polish Workers• Party Central 
Committee formally elected Edward Gierek First Secretary. Gierek 
then appeared on television, publicly acknowledged the leadership's 
mistakes, and promised a revision of economic and other policies.
As a result, strikes and disturbances died down and protests planned 
in other cities were cancelled.'*'
The riots, which brought Gierek, a Communist reformer, to 
power in 1970 reinforce the premise that popular dissent or revolt 
in Eastern Europe are the only means available to the Eastern 
European peoples to liberalize the Communist system of government. 
This has consistently proven to be the case. However, the Czechs 
and the Poles have opted for different means of protest to accom­
plish their goals. The Poles have usually chosen violence, while 
the Czechs have preferred passive resistance. Both nations have 
succeeded in overthrowing conservative Communist regimes, although 
the threat or actuality of Soviet military intervention has deprived 
the two peoples of the complete democratization of the Communist 
system of government.
In its first year, the new Gierek leadership rescinded the 
previously announced price increases and instituted a price freeze,
gave pay increases to the lowest paid workers, postponed an unpopu­
lar wage reform, and eased the farmers' obligatory sales to the 
state. (About 80 to 85 percent of Poland's agricultural land is 
in private hands.) Gierek also declared his intention to continue 
good governmental relations with Poland's powerful Roman Catholic 
hierarchy. Furthermore, he made concessions to popular sentiments, 
among them to rebuild the royal palace in Warsaw which had been 
destroyed during the war. GomuXka had refused to rebuild the 
palace because it represented the Polish aristocracy.
Gierek has also turned heavily to the West for trade, 
investments, and technology. Over three hundred Western industrial 
concerns have located plants in Poland under agreements that permit 
production to be sold in Western markets to repay Poland's enormous 
indebtedness to the West--no.w around two billion dollars.
However, Gierek has sometimes been ambivalent concerning 
his reforms of Poland's Communist system of government. The Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia stands as a constant reminder that Gierek
must remain cautious for fear of Soviet intervention into his own
+ 2 country.
In April, 1 9 6 9, Alexander Dubcek lost his position as First 
Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party because of the "human 
torch" January, 1969» death of Jan Palach who was protesting against 
Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs, and the 
anti-Soviet riots which erupted in Prague and other Czechoslovak 
cities in March, 1969t as a result of the Czechoslovak victory over 
the Soviet Union at the World Hockey Championships in Stockholm.
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The Soviet leadership replaced Dubcek with Gustav Husak, a conser­
vative Slovak lawyer who had spent six years in prison during the 
Stalinist period for "Slovak nationalism".
Husak then set out to destroy the reforms of the Dubcek 
era and to return Czechoslovakia to a close alliance with the 
Soviet Union. He ordered increased police surveillance of all 
liberals involved in the "Prague Spring". Even though the December 
riots in Poland appear to have caused only indifference among the 
people in Czechoslovakia, the Gierek liberalization provoked wide­
spread consternation within the conservative Czechoslovak regime, 
composed of former Novotnyites who returned to power after the 
Invasion. On February 2.5, 1971, Kaska, the Minister of the 
Interior, told members of his ministry about the "dangerous 
developments" in Poland and said that if Gierek failed to master
the situation, "international assistance," e. g., military inter-
3vention, would be necessary.
Kaska's reaction to the Gierek liberalization in Poland 
confirms once again the Marshall R. Singer hypothesis stated in 
Chapter I. The hypothesis deals with the role of the elites in 
two weak Communist states (A and B) which are equally dependent on 
a strong third state (X). The hypothesis states that if the elites 
of weak state B hold a political perception different from that of 
strong state X, the likelihood is that the international political 
behavior of the elites in weak state A will more closely resemble 
and support the political behavior of X than they will of the 
political behavior of B.
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In 1956» GomuXka (B) deviated from the conservative 
Marxist-Leninist norm, and Novotny (A) did not support him because 
he feared that the new "Titoism" in Poland would prove to be 
contagious in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, he closed the Czecho­
slovak- Polish border and jammed Polish radio broadcasts. Moreover, 
Novotny supported the Soviet elite's (X) threats against GomuXka's 
government as well as its simultaneous suppression of the Hungarian 
Uprising.
In 1968, GomuXka and Ulbricht (A) feared the liberalization 
of the Dubcek government (B) in Czechoslovakia. They, along with 
the Hungarian and Bulgarian elites, supported the Brezhnev regime 
(X) through their participation in the military aggression against 
Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. The elite's fear of a loss of 
their absolute power through democratization of the Communist 
system of government precipitated the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In 1971, the conservative elites in Czechoslovakia (A), 
then and now staunch supporters of a close"Czechoslovak alliance 
with the Soviet. Union, criticized sharply Gierek's liberalization 
in Poland. Out of fear that Gierek's liberal ideas might spread to 
Czechoslovakia, the conservative Czechoslovak elites even referred 
to the possibility of "international assistance" to suppress Polish 
liberalism.
The above facts concerning the conservative Eastern European 
elites vis-^-vis the Soviet Union confirm Singer's hypothesis. 
Because the conservative Eastern European elites are willing to 
support the Soviet Union to suppress any liberal tendencies within
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another Eastern European state, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe
has been maintained. The conservative elites fear that any
liberalization within Eastern Europe will undermine their absolute 
power base. The brutality of the conservative Eastern European 
elites, demonstrated in their suppression of liberalization in 
other Eastern European states, has also been consistently 
reinforced by the negative attitudes and indifference of the 
Eastern European peoples for their neighbors.
Current Developments in Czechoslovakia and in Poland
Material well-being may seduce some Czechs and Slovaks to
overlook their hatred of the Soviet-imposed post-invasion Husak 
regime in Czechoslovakia. Likewise, the rising standard of living 
in Poland under the quasi-liberal Gierek regime may seduce some 
Poles to overlook the Polish government's imprisonment of those 
Poles who rioted in June, 1976. (See Chapter I.) Ho\irever, the 
drive to democratize the system and the thirst for greater freedom 
of expression will not die among the peoples within the two 
countries under study in this work. The current Charter 77 movement 
in Czechoslovakia and the dissident movement in Poland led by 
Jerzy Andrzejewski, Poland's most eminent contemporary novelist, 
indicate this fact. However, it is the opinion of the author that 
the post-Helsinki dissidence throughout Eastern Europe (except 
Bulgaria) and the Soviet Union is not interrelated. The Helsinki 
Declaration has acted as a rallying point for dissidents in each 
individual state to press each Eastern European regime to honor its
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Helsinki commitments through the granting of greater freedom of 
expression as well as through the respecting of fundamental human 
rights.
Poles enjoy increased freedom of expression under Gierek, 
but the shortages of meat and sugar remain national scandals and 
are the source of much popular dissatisfaction with the Gierek 
regime. On the contrary, Czechoslovakia enjoys the second highest 
standard of living in the entire socialist bloc, having been 
overtaken in recent years by the German Democratic Republic. For
many years Czechoslovakia enjoyed the title of "showcase" of 
socialism.
Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Czechs have become
increasingly more materialistic through their possession of
automobiles and summer cottages to which they escape frequently
from the heat and political repression of the larger cities. The
stores and meat shops are also well-stocked with goods. Therefore,
the Czechs do not sympathize with the Poles' economic difficulties.
However, contrary to the Poles who have been enjoying greater
freedom since 1970, the Czechs have encountered the horror of
post-invasion "normalization", e. g., the increasing loss of their
personal freedom proportional to their increasing rise in materialism.
The Czechs feel that they have been universally betrayed not only
by their socialist allies in Eastern Europe and especially by their
traditional ally, the Soviet Union, but also by the West. Wide-
kspread despondency exists in Czechoslovakia today.
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The Party in Czechoslovakia has had an increasingly more 
difficult time in coercing younger Czechs and Slovaks to join the 
Party since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The young in 
Poland have also been reluctant to join the Party which has become 
increasingly the fortress of the older and more conservative Party 
members. The Polish youth demanded their own Dubcek in 1968 and 
opposed their government's decision to intervene militarily in 
Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, the Czech youth saw Polish and Russian 
soldiers murder their innocent brothers, sisters, parents, and 
friends. Polish participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
will most likely prevent the Czech and Polish youths from forming 
a common front to demand the democratization of the Communist 
system within their respective states. Polish participation in 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia rejuvinated traditional Czech 
animosity- toward the entire Polish nation as the negative Czech 
reaction to the Polish tourists in Czechoslovakia at the time of 
the invasion indicates. The memory of the Polish troops' killing 
of Czech citizens in 1968 will die hard among Czech youth. An 
excellent opportunity for Czech-Polish rapprochement has appar­
ently perished.
There is widespread fear throughout. Czechoslovakia and 
Poland of Soviet military intervention as in Hungary in 19.56 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 to suppress any popular revolts against the 
Communist regimes in power. The Brezhnev Doctrine still leaves 
open the question as to what deviations are allowed in Eastern 
Europe, and as to whether the Soviet regime would be willing to
9^
embarrass itself in world opinion again.
Given the current emphasis on detente and the Helsinki 
Declaration which guarantees that each sovereign signatory in 
Europe will honor the sovereignty of the other signatories, the 
likelihood is minimal that the Soviet regime would embarrass 
itself again and intervene militarily in the internal affairs of 
an Eastern European state. However, the perceived fear of Soviet 
intervention dampens the quest for greater democratization of the 
Communist system of government. Gierek treads as lightly as does 
the Polish opposition.
In Poland, widespread consternation exists concerning the
Gierek regime's lack of either a political or an economic solution
to Poland’s economic difficulties. The Polish writer in the
L'Expreas article cited in Chapter I states that a possible
insurrection could erupt at any moment in Poland. However, it is
the opinion of the author that most Poles do not desire a national
insurrection for fear of Soviet intervention. This premise is
substantiated in the following statement by a prominent Polish
dissident: "We are always afraid of one thing. We don't want a
Czechoslovakia on our soil. It would be a real war. I've seen
5Warsaw leveled once in my lifetime and that's enough."
Other Polish dissidents feel that the Czechoslovak 
experience must not hinder their efforts to pressure the Gierek 
regime to continue its policies of liberalization in Poland. One 
of the dissidents, Jacek Huron, states the following:
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Our country's representatives should come to 
an understanding directly with the Soviet government 
as to the limits of the reforms (in Poland). We 
mustn't let ourselves be haunted by Czechoslovakia's 
experience and believe that these limits have been 
drawn once and for all. If there is no force within 
the government capable of undertaking such a dialogue, 
then social movements— -at present marginal— could 
help make the change by the influence and pressure .g 
they can bring to bear on the established hierarchy.
Perspectives
If a Polish insurrection were to occur, however improbable 
given the fear of Soviet military intervention, it appears 
reasonable to assume that the Czechs would not support it. It is 
simply not within the Czech national character to rise up in violent 
revolt against an oppressive government because the Czechs have 
consistently resorted to passive resistance and devious maneuver­
ing. The Poles have always looked upon the Czech national 
preference for passivity with contempt.
Furthermore, the Czechs enjoy a standard of living 20 to 
25 percent higher than that of the Poles. The higher standard of 
living in Czechoslovakia has contributed to a certain stability in 
that country. Economic stability in Czechoslovakia precluded a 
revolt in 1956, while neighboring Poland and Hungary erupted into 
violence. The 1970 and 1976 Polish riots, both provoked by economic 
catalysts, appear to have initiated no sympathy among the Czechs.
A repeat of the 1956 events when the Hungarians, linked by 
a long tradition of friendship with the Poles, rose up .in revolt in 
mutual support of the Poles, seems highly unlikely in the case of 
the Czechs and the Poles. Czech support of a potential Polish
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insurrection appears to be improbable because Czech-Polish friend­
ship simply does not exist.
One other factor must be considered, the resolution of 
Czech and Slovak animosity. Czech-Slovak conflicts, which helped 
to destroy the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1959 and to trigger 
the "Prague Spring" in 1968, have been resolved. As of January 1, 
1 9 6 9, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is a federal state. Czechs 
no longer dominate the Slovak bureaucracy or control Slovak affairs 
from Prague as were the cases under the First Republic and the 
i960 Constitution. Furthermore, the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
contributed to a solidarity between the two peoples'which had not 
previously existed. Therefore, it appears unlikely that Slovak 
nationalism v/ill contribute to further discord within the Czecho­
slovak Socialist Republic.
Based upon the preceding analysis of such factors as 
traditional Czech-Polish hostility and mutual cultural prejudice,. 
Polish participation in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and 
the higher standard of living in Czechoslovakia compared to that of 
Poland, one can assume that the Czechs would not support an initial 
Polish insurrection. Moreover, excellent Czech-Polish relations 
within the economic sphere have not led to political integration 
between Czechoslovakia and Poland as is evidenced in the third 
chapter of this study. Czech-Polish antagonisms have remained 
intact to this day.
The historical animosities between the Czechs and the Poles 
are the tragedy of Eastern Europe because the Czechs and the Poles
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are two of the region's most powerful and influential nations.
Their mutual cultural prejudices, hostilities, and indifference have 
guaranteed Soviet hegemony in Czechoslovakia and in Poland. The 
tragedy of the Czechs and the Poles is the tragedy of all of the 
peoples of Eastern Europe.
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APPENDIX A 
THE FULL TEXT OF CHARTER 77*
Law No. 120 of the Czechoslovak Collection of Laws, published 
on October 13, 1976, incltidea the text of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both signed on behalf of our 
republic in 1968 and confirmed at the 1975 Helsinki Conference.
These pacts went into effect in our country on March 23, 1976: since
that date our citizens have had the right, and the state has had 
the duty, to abide by them.
The freedoms guaranteed to individuals by the two documents 
are important assets of civilisation. They have been the goals of 
campaigns by many progressive people in the past, and their enact­
ment can significantly contribute to a humane development of our 
society. We welcome the fact that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
has agreed to enter into these covenants.
Their publication, however, is at the same time an urgent 
reminder of the many fundamental human rights that regrettably exist 
in our country only on paper. The right of free expression guaran­
teed by Article 19 of the first pact, for example, is quite illu­
sory. Tens of thousands of citizens have been prevented from 
working in their professions for the sole reason that their views 
differ from the official ones. They have been the frequent targets 
of various forms of discrimination and chicanery on.the part of the
*From "Czechoslovak Charter 77~-the full text," The Guardian 
(February 1.3, 197?), p. 9*
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authorities or social organisations; they have been denied any 
opportunity to defend themselves and are practically the victims of 
apartheid. Hundreds of thousands of other citizens have.been 
denied the "freedom from fear" cited in the preamble of the first 
pactr they live in constant peril of losing their jobs or other 
benefits if they express their opinions.
Contrary to Article 13 of the second pact, guaranteeing the 
right to education, many young people are prevented from pursuing 
higher education because of their views or even because of their 
parents* views. Countless citizens worry that if they declare 
their convictions, they themselves or their children will be deprived 
of an education.
Exercising the right to "seek, receive and impart informa­
tion regardless of frontiers and of whether it is oral, written or 
printed," or "imparted through art"— Point 2, Article 13 of the first 
pact— can result in persecution not only outside the court but also 
inside. Frequently this occurs under the pretext of a criminal 
indictment (as evidenced, among other instances, by the recent trial 
of young musicians).
Freedom of speech is suppressed by the government's manage­
ment of all mass media, incliiding the publishing and cultural 
institutions. No political, philosophical, scientific or artistic 
work that deviates in the slightest from the narrow framework of 
official ideology or aesthetics is permitted to be produced. Public 
criticism of social conditions is prohibited. Public defense 
•against false and defamatory charges by official propaganda organs
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is impossible despite the legal protection against attacks on one's 
reputation and honour unequivocally afforded by Article 17 of the 
first pact. False accusations cannot be refuted, and it is futile 
to attempt rectification or to seek legal redress. Open discussion 
of intellectual and cultural matters is out of the question. Many 
scientific and cultural workers as well as other citizens have been 
discriminated against simply because some years ago they legally 
published or openly articulated views condemned by the current 
political power.
Religious freedom, emphatically guaranteed by Article l8 
of the first pact, is systematically curbed with a despotic 
arbitrariness: limits are imposed on the activities of priests
who are constantly threatened with the revocation of government 
permission to perform their function; persons who manifest their 
religious faith either by word or action lose their jobs or are 
made to suffer other repressions; religious instruction in schools 
is suppressed, etc.
A whole range of civil rights is severely restricted or 
completely suppressed by the effective method of subordinating all 
institutions and organisations in the state to the political 
directives of the ruling party's apparatuses and the pronouncements 
of highly influential individuals. Neither the constitution of 
the &SSR nor any of the country's other legal procedures regulate 
the contents, form or application of such pronouncements, which 
are frequently issued orally, unbeknown to and beyond the control 
of the average citizen.
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Their authors are responsible only to themselves and their 
own hierarchy, yet they have a decisive influence on the activity 
of the legislative as well as executive bodies of the state admini­
stration, on the courts, trade unions, social organisations, other 
political parties, business, factories, schools and similar 
installations, and their orders take precedence over the laws.
If some organisations or citizens, in the interpretation 
of their rights and duties, become involved in a conflict with the 
directives, they cannot turn to a neutral authority for none exists. 
Consequently, the right of assembly and the prohibition of its 
restraint, stemming from Articles 21 and 22 of the first pact; the 
right to participate in public affairs, in Article 25; and the 
right to equality before the law, in Article 26— all have been 
seriously curtailed.
These conditions prevent working people from freely 
establishing labour and other organisations for the protection of 
their economic and social interests, and from freely using their 
right to strike as provided in Point 1, Article 8 of the second 
pact.
Other civil rights, including the virtual banning of "wil­
ful interference with private life, the family, home, and corres­
pondence" in Article 1? of the first pact, are gravely circum­
scribed by the fact that the Interior Ministry employs various 
practices to control the daily existence of citizens— such as 
telephone tapping and the surveillance of private homes, watching 
mail, shadowing individuals, searching apartments, and recruiting
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a network of informers from the ranks of the population (often by- 
illegal intimidation, or, sometimes, promises), etc.
The ministry frequently interferes in the decisions.of 
employers, inspires discrimination by authorities and organisations, 
influences the organs of justice, and even supervises the 
propaganda campaigns of the mass media. This activity is not 
regulated by laws, it is covert, so the citizen is unable to 
protect himself against it.
In the cases of politically motivated persecution, the 
organs of interrogation and justice violate the rights of the 
defendants and their counsel, contrary to Article'll of the first 
pact as well as Czechoslovakia's own laws. People thus sentenced 
to jail are being treated in a manner that violates their human 
dignity, impairs their health, and attempts to break them morally.
Point 2, Article 12 of the first pact, guaranteeing the 
right to freely leave one's country, is generally violated. Under 
the pretext of "protecting the state security," contained in Point 
3, departure is tied to various illegal conditions. Just as 
arbitrary are the procedures for issuing visas to foreign nationals, 
many of whom are prevented from visiting Czechoslovakia because they 
had some official or friendly contact with persons who had been 
discriminated against in our country.
Some citizens— privately at their places of work, or through 
the media abroad (the only public forum available to them)-— have 
drawn attention to these systematic violations of human rights and 
democratic freedoms and have demanded a remedy in specific cases.
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But they have received no response, or have themselves become the 
objects of investigation.
The responsibility for the preservation of civil rights 
naturally/rests with the state power. But not on it alone. Every 
individual bears a share of responsibility for the general 
conditions in the country, and therefore also for compliance with 
the enacted pacts, which are as binding for the people as for the 
government.
The feeling of this co-responsibility, the belief'in the 
value of civic engagement and the readiness to be engaged, together 
with the need to seek a new and more effective expression, gave us 
the idea of creating Charter 77, whose existence we publicly 
announce.
Charter 77 is a free and informal and open association of 
people of various convictions, religions and professions, linked by 
the desire to work individually and collectively for respect for 
human and civil rights in Czechoslovakia and the world— the rights 
provided for in the enacted international pacts, in the Final Act 
of the Helsinki Conference, and in numerous other international 
documents against wars, violence and social and mental oppression.
It represents a'general declaration of human rights.
Charter 77 is founded on the concepts of solidarity and 
friendship of people, who share a concern for the fate of ideals to 
which they have linked their lives and work.
Charter 77 is not an organisation; it has no statutes, 
permanent organs or registered membership. Everyone who agrees with
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its idea and participates in its work and supports it,, belongs to 
it.
Charter 77 is not intended to be a basis for opposition 
political activity. Its desire is to serve the common interest, 
as have numerous similar organisations of civic initiative. East 
and West. It has no intention of initiating its own programmes 
for political or social reforms or changes, but it wants to lead 
in the sphere of its activity by means of a constructive, dialogue 
with the political and state authorities— and particularly by 
drawing attention to various specific violations of civil and human 
rights, by preparing their documentation, by suggesting solutions, 
by submitting various more-general proposals aimed at furthering 
these rights and their guarantees, by acting as a mediator in the 
event of conflict which might result in wrong-doings, etc.
By its symbolic name, Charter 77 stresses that it has been 
established on the threshold of what has been declared the year of 
political prisoners, in the course of which a meeting in Belgrade 
is to review the progress— or lack of it— achieved since the 
Helsinki Conference.
As signatories of this declaration, we designate Dr. Jan 
Patocka, Dr. Vaclav Havel and Professor Jiri Hajek to act as spokes­
men for Charter 77. These spokesmen are authorised to represent 
Charter 77 before the state and other organisations, as well as 
before the public at home and throughout the world, and, they 
guarantee the authenticity of the documents by their signatures.
In us and other citizens, who will join Charter 77, they will find
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their collaborators who will participate in the necessary 
negotiations, who will accept partial tasks, and will share the 
entire responsibility.
We trust that Charter 77 will contribute to making it 
possible for all citizens of Czechoslovakia to live and work as 
free people.
APPENDIX B 
THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE*
In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, the ques­
tion of the relationship and interconnection between the socialist 
countries' national interests and their internationalist obligations 
has.assumed'particular urgency and sharpness. The measures taken 
jointly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to defend 
the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of enormous 
significance for strengthening the socialist commonwealth, which is 
the main achievement of the international working class.
At the same time it is impossible to ignore the allegations
being heard in some places that the actions of the five socialist
countries contradict the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty 
and the right of the nations to self-determination.
Such arguments are untenable primarily because they are 
based on an abstract, non-class approach to the question of sover­
eignty and the right of nations to self-determination.
There is no doubt that the peoples of the. socialist countrie
and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine 
their country's path of development. However, any decision of 
theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the 
worldwide workers' movement which is waging a struggle for socialism.
* •.From "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist
Countries," Pravda (September 25» 1968) as cited in Ducha^ek, Ivo, 
Nations and Men (Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press, 1975)» P« ;+2A.
lo8
The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed 
to the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement, . .  . 
As a social system, world socialism is the common gain of the 
working people of all lands; it is indivisible and its defense is 
the common cause of all Communists, The weakening of any link in 
the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist 
countries which cannot be indifferent. Thus, the antisocialist 
forces in Czechoslovakia were in.essence using talk about the 
right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called 
neutrality and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic’s withdrawal 
from the socialist commonwealth. But implementation of such 
"self-determination," e. g., Czechoslovakia's separation from the 
socialist commonwealth, would run counter to Czechoslovakia's 
fundamental interests and would harm the other socialist countries. 
Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops might 
approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of European socialist 
countries could be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital 
interest of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts 
the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination, . . .
Those who speak of the "illegality" of the allied socialist 
countries' actions in Czechoslovakia forget that in a class society 
there is and can be no such thing as non-class law. Laws and norms 
of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the 
laws of social development. . . .
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